Wednesday, December 31, 2014

ISIS Eyes Influence in Pakistan ?

Policy Brief: ISIS Eyes Influence in Pakistan: Focus, Fears and Future Prospects
Jinnah Institute, December 21, 2014
By Hassan Abbas


The rapidly expanding militant force in Iraq and Syria known globally by its Arabic acronym Daesh (al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham) or in English ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) is neither a myth nor does it appear to be a fleeting phenomenon. Tragically, it is real and has historical roots. The militant group has succeeded in rapidly taking control of a large tract of territory in Iraq, as well as erasing parts of the border between Iraq and Syria, conceptually establishing its writ in a way that is more than a sanctuary but insufficient to place it in the category of a state. At best it is a fluid state at the moment – with its foundations soaking in blood and its architecture being constructed on the pillars of brutality, fear, oppression and distortion of Islamic principles. Its genesis in the contemporary context is not organic in nature but arguably a product of mistaken and misdirected global policies. History too has played its hand but the recent turmoil in Middle East, sectarian proxy wars, and confused handling of the Arab spring, have all influenced this state of affairs. The Al-Qaeda narrative has also contributed to this rise as an effort to establish an ‘Islamic State’ with military objectives and expansionist ideals. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self appointed ‘caliph’ of the ISIS lacks any religious credentials and doesn’t even have support of major extremist Muslim groups around the world – but he has what none of them have – direct control of territory where around 8 million Muslims live. The five-year ISIS expansionist program is evident from the map that it purportedly released showing Pakistan as part of its ‘Khurasan’ province.3


For complete brief (pdf) click here

India - Pakistan Relations After Modi


Indo-Pak Relations: A Window of Opportunity that has Almost Closed
Economic & Political Weekly, Vol - XLIX No. 51, December 20, 2014 By Neeti Nair

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led government, with its massive majority, presents a real window of opportunity to interrogate and deepen processes already at play between India and Pakistan. However, the recent resurgence of Hindutva over governance amounts to letting go of this opportunity.
Neeti Nair (neetinair@yahoo.com) is associate professor of history at the University of Virginia, United States. She is the author of Changing Homelands: Hindu Politics and the Partition of India, Harvard and Permanent Black, 2011.

Scholars, foreign policy analysts, and journalists focusing on Indo-Pak relations have long described these relations as “intractable”.[i] Even those analysts who have highlighted the recent “unprecedented initiatives taken by individual policymakers” have been guarded against such optimism; they have noted the “dictates of state-level pressures” and “political and institutional opposition in both countries”.[ii] They refer, in particular, to the pressures exerted by allies and the opposition on weak coalition governments — the norm in India for the last two decades. This essay contends that the new Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led government, with its massive majority, presents a real window of opportunity to interrogate and deepen diplomatic processes already at play between India and Pakistan. However, the recent resurgence of Hindutva over governance amounts to letting go of this opportunity.

Writing on the eve of the 16th Lok Sabha election results, Pranay Sharma, foreign editor at Outlook magazine, said that it is likely that regional parties would be part of the coalition at the centre. He also highlighted the attendant opportunities and difficulties that such an arrangement would entail for the crafting of a new foreign policy.[iii] The BJP hardly needed any allies to form government: with 282 seats, they had won over half the seats in Parliament. Commentators who tried to read between the lines of BJP’s electoral campaign and Narendra Modi’s new pan-Indian appeal argued that this was a mandate for development and governance, not Hindutva.[iv] This much was clear: the newly formed government had a solid majority to take significant steps towards transforming Indo-Pak relations.

Squandering Away the Opportunity

The Modi government’s early days suggested precisely this possibility. For his swearing-in ceremony, Modi invited all of India’s neighbors, including Pakistan. The symbolism of the shawl and sari that were exchanged between Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Narendra Modi (for the former’s wife and the latter’s mother) garnered much attention in the media and raised hopes of a new beginning in Indo-Pak relations. Some journalists also pointed to the fact that it had not been easy for Nawaz Sharif to ride roughshod over the army’s objections and come to India.

The tide began to turn later in the summer, after Modi took charge. There was heavy cross-border firing, which reportedly resulted in the death of five civilians and one Indian constable, across the LoC between India and Pakistan in October-November 2014.

For complete essay, click here

Yale Press Blog: 'Inside the World of ISIS — The Arab Taliban'

Inside the World of ISIS—The Arab Taliban
 Yale University Press, December 11, 2014
By Hassan Abbas

During my recent travels to Iraq, I heard first hand stories about the genesis and rise of Islamic State of Iraq & Syria (ISIS), also known by its Arabic acronym Daesh (al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham). The rapid expansion of this deadly militant group over a significant chunk of Iraq materialized through sheer brutality, oppression, and tyranny. A large section of the Syria-Iraq border region has evaporated in the process enabling collaboration and synergy among battle hardened militants from the Syrian warzone—an incubator for the new generation of terrorists. These militants are made up of Salafi strategists; foot soldiers from Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Jordan (financed largely by wealthy donors in Qatar, Kuwait & Saudi Arabia); and fighters belonging to Zarqawi inspired “Al-Qaeda in Iraq.” In the case of Iraq, old Baathists (who are careful to wear masks during ISIS parades) also jumped in the fray in hopes of reclaiming at least some part of their lost power and prestige. Credible media reports maintain that militants from over 80 countries— including Western states—are represented in the conflict theatre. Leading this dynamic and diverse bunch of thugs is Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the mysterious leader of ISIS, who is the self-proclaimed “Caliph” of this so-called “Islamic State”—a fluid state at best which, in reality, is a professionally guarded and well equipped sanctuary of terror. Massacring Muslims and non-Muslims alike and beheading any Westerners that they can get their hands on are the trademarks of ISIS.

The idea of ISIS is neither new nor unique. Their tactics are modern but their ideology borrows from an extremist strain within the Muslim discourse. In more ways than one, the group is a byproduct of modern Muslim Wars. This includes internal conflicts as well as violent regional rivalries ranging from Iran versus Saudi Arabia to the Israel-Palestine clash. Many observers in the Middle East I talked to also blame the Western powers for their unconditional support and arming of “rebels” in Syria who ultimately grew into ISIS.

Shia versus Sunni is yet another lens through which this crisis is being viewed, but an astute Iraqi-American scholar told me that within Iraq many Shia political leaders view the ISIS onslaught primarily as a Sunni versus Sunni encounter inspired by regional oil politics. Turkish over-enthusiasm to expand its regional influence muddied the waters too.


For complete article, click here