Saturday, December 31, 2011

Understanding the 'New' Egypt

The real questions for Egypt

In an interview with Ezzat Ibrahim, John L. Esposito*, a leading American scholar of Islamic affairs, examines the aftermath of the upheavals of the Arab Spring and the rise of the Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia
Al-Ahram, 29 December 2011 - 4 January 2012; Issue No. 1078

What was your reading of the results of the first rounds of the Egyptian parliamentary elections?

A couple of things, I think. As many expected, the Muslim Brotherhood did well, and this was the case for a variety of reasons. You don't have a strong multi-party system yet in Egypt, for example. I wrote earlier that in both the Tunisian and Egyptian cases, the Islamists could be expected to get around 40 per cent of the vote. However, what has surprised many people was the rise of the Salafis, which had been relatively politically invisible for many of us in terms of the political scene. I think that with the emergence of the Salafis, we have seen them emerging politically and there has been a sense that after all the years in which whenever one thought of the Islamist movement it was in terms of the ikhwan, the Brotherhood, now the Salafis have entered politics and the Nour Party has emerged and done relatively well in the elections.

I think that one of the questions that clearly will exist more for the Nour Party than for the ikhwan, because the latter has a much longer track record, is its platform on a number of issues, including the ultra-conservative rhetoric that has called for the imposition of Sharia Law, for example. The Nour Party has been trying to present a more accommodating platform on this. Some observers would say that there have been contradictions between the more recent positions that the Nour Party has taken up, which are accommodating, and what some of the individual candidates have actually been saying. I think the role of the Salafis in Egypt is to be contrasted with Tunisia, where you don't have this phenomenon at all.

The Salafist movement is a new phenomenon on the political scene. Is it an extension of the Wahabi school of thought or is it more deeply rooted?
Talking about the Salafis, even the word is difficult because the term Salafi has meant so many different things. The most basic meaning has to do with the early followers or companions of the Prophet. Then, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, you had the great Islamic reformer Mohamed Abdu, whose movement was also called Salafi. Recently, the term has tended to be applied to people who are what I would call ultra-conservative, and it gets used at times interchangeably with wahabi. I think that there is something in common with the Saudi Salafis and the Salafis in the Gulf, because the Salafi movement extends over many parts of the Muslim world, including many Gulf countries. The Wahabi movement is a Saudi phenomenon that supports the Salafis wherever it finds them. However, the Salafis in different countries reflect the realities of the countries they are in.

Yet, there are two important distinctions that I often make. Some Salafis tend to be non- political: they are very conservative, very much followers of orthodox Islam, but they are non- political. There were many such groups in Egypt under Mubarak of this sort that were invisible. Then there are other Salafis who are political, and there is a third kind whom I would call militant Salafis, and I think all these groups need to be distinguished from each other. The militant Salafis are the people who are sometimes called jihadists when they engage in violence.

For complete article, click here

For background, see:
Divisions emerge between Islamists in Egypt - Miami Herald
Egyptian military gambles by raiding pro-democracy groups - Washington Post
Tribal loyalties sway votes in south Egypt - The National

Thursday, December 22, 2011

How Obama Can Fix U.S.- Pakistani Relations - Foreign Affairs

How Obama Can Fix U.S.-Pakistani Relations
Helping Islamabad Through The Democratic Transition

The U.S.-Pakistani relationship has become defined by mutual dissatisfaction and by impatience on both sides. The November 26 NATO operation in Pakistan's northwestern tribal area, which led to the deaths of more than two dozen Pakistani soldiers, is a case in point. In a recent town hall meeting in Islamabad with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, an audience member complained that the United States is "like a mother-in-law." "We are trying to please you," she said, "and every time you come and visit us you have a new idea."

The problem, of course, is larger than any American failure to consistently convey its preferences to Pakistan, such as its requests that Pakistan stop distinguishing between "good" Taliban and "bad" Taliban and it aid Washington in defeating the insurgency in Afghanistan. Like some daughters-in-law, Pakistan disregards the nagging. Indeed, it might not be capable of living up to U.S. demands even if it wanted to. Repairing the fractured relationship will require creativity. More, it will require a reappraisal of U.S. strategic interests in South Asia.

Pakistan is just under four years into a difficult democratic transition. Commentators argue for giving the country some time, while empowering its democratic civilian government over its military. That, they believe, will eventually set the country right. Yet for the civilians to be supreme, they first need to be competent. That does not happen overnight. Poor governance -- a product of severe economic mismanagement, rampant corruption, and bureaucratic inability -- tops the list of causes of Pakistan's predicament.

Take the state of affairs in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which borders Afghanistan. The nearly ten million Pashtuns who live in the mountainous buffer zone are governed by a draconian British-era civil code. Extremely isolated, this unfortunate land has been a staging ground for militants and warriors of all stripes for decades. After 9/11, things in FATA got even worse. Islamabad had no coherent policy for handling the terrorists who converged on the area. In some cases, it waited too long before acting, and in others, the military used disproportionate force, leading to high civilian casualties. A new generation of Taliban emerged, in the process wreaking havoc on the rest of the country. In the last decade, terrorists, mostly operating out of FATA, have killed some 25,000 Pakistani civilians, 4,000 army soldiers, and 3,500 law enforcement officials. After the civilians came to power again in 2008, they attempted political reforms in FATA, but only on paper; civilian and military leaders were never able to come to a consensus on implementing reforms. The governance problems in the rest of Pakistan are less extreme but no less problematic. 

One bright spot in recent years has been a vibrant lawyers' movement that seemed to signal the dawn of a new professional and largely independent judiciary. Hopes were dashed however, due to the government's lack of investment in, and the general dysfunction of, the criminal justice system. The net result is further public disenchantment with the country's leading political parties and the rise of the charismatic former cricket hero Imran Khan, who leads the Justice Party and pledges to clean the political Augean stables and strengthen independent judiciary.
 
The fault is not the government's alone. Because of the burgeoning defense budget -- some of which was meant to enhance counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capacity -- there has been little funding to do anything, especially to build up a civilian law enforcement capacity. Pakistan's police are severely underequipped, poorly trained, and subject to political manipulation. Politicians often favor loyalty over merit in appointments and transfers. At their roots, terrorism and violent religious extremism are law enforcement problems, but without forensic laboratories, a sound criminal justice system, and investigative capabilities, the state cannot fight them. Nor can the military: it is not trained or organized to perform domestic law and order duties. Moreover, it has failed whenever called on to do so, preferring instead to build up against external threats, primarily India.

For complete article, click here

Sunday, December 18, 2011

Belfer Centre Policy Paper: "The Exaggerated Threat of American Muslim "Homegrown" Terrorism"


"The Exaggerated Threat of American Muslim "Homegrown" Terrorism"

This policy brief is based on "Muslim 'Homegrown' Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the Threat?" which appears in the fall 2011 issue ofInternational Security.
BOTTOM LINES

  • A Common Misperception. Despite warnings by public officials and terrorism analysts, there is little evidence that the risk of terrorist attacks in the United States by American Muslims is especially serious or growing.
  • Rare and Unsophisticated Attacks. Terrorist plots by American Muslims are not growing in sophistication, and terrorists' capacities to acquire skills from overseas training are limited. In addition, contrary to concerns that so-called lone wolves will increasingly attempt terrorist attacks that are difficult to foil, there have been only two shootings in the United States by American Muslims since September 11, 2011, despite a significant propaganda effort by leaders of al-Qaida encouraging such attacks.
  • Consequences of Exaggerating the Threat. Misjudging the threat of Muslim homegrown terrorism generates serious risks, such as alienating American Muslim communities, whose demonstrated willingness to expose aspiring militants is an important reason why the homegrown threat has remained small.
  • LITTLE EVIDENCE OF AMERICAN MUSLIMS PLOTTING ATTACKS
    In recent years, public officials in the United States and terrorism analysts here and abroad have warned of an increasing threat of Muslim homegrown terrorist attacks. The terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 perpetrated by European homegrown terrorists have contributed to these concerns, as has the surge in terrorist-related arrests in the United States in 2009 and 2010. Among these are the high-profile arrests of Maj. Nidal Hasan, who engaged Securityin a deadly shooting spree at Fort Hood, Texas, in November 2009, and Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to bomb Times Square in May 2010. A closer look at the evidence, however, reveals that the threat of American Muslims engaging in lethal attacks in the United States has been frequently overstated.
    Contrary to the conventional wisdom, American Muslims do not appear to be increasingly motivated to commit terrorist acts in the United States. Recent studies of the "radicalization" of American Muslims accused of engaging in domestic terrorism have explored the life histories of these individuals, and they have provided insight into the extremist beliefs and changes in behavior that preceded the turn to violence. Yet these studies offer little evidence that American Muslims—even those exhibiting the danger signs of radicalization—will increasingly engage in acts of terrorism against fellow Americans. In fact, there is minimal evidence that American Muslims are becoming more radical in their beliefs. Surveys in 2011 by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press reveal no trend of growing support for militancy among American Muslims.
    In addition, a surge in the number of American Muslims arrested on terrorism-related offenses in recent years does not mean that this segment of society is more prone to engage in terrorism. As a result of expanded initiatives in domestic counterterrorism by the Department of Homeland Security and new FBI authority to undertake "assessments" and open preliminary investigations of suspect Americans, officials increasingly have the tools to detect terrorist activity in its early stages. According to the New York Times, from March 31, 2009 to March 31, 2011, the FBI initiated more than 82,000 assessments of individuals and groups suspected of being involved in terrorist activities in the United States.
    Combine this enhanced ability to detect aspiring terrorists with law enforcement's frequent use of sting operations to advance plots that might have otherwise gone nowhere, and one can largely account for the spike in terrorist-related arrests. For example, of the eighteen attacks attempted against U.S. targets since September 11 that reached some level of operational development (targets chosen, surveillance undertaken, and the like), twelve involved the use of federal officials at the plots' formative stages.
    The surge in arrests could also be the result of a clustering of arrests of those long engaged in militancy or the apprehension of large groups of individuals, such as members of the Daniel Boyd network or Somali al-Shabaab recruits. In short, improvements in detection or other actions by law enforcement could be contributing to the increase in the number of individuals charged with terrorism-related offenses independent of any larger trends in the American population.
    THE CHALLENGE OF AVOIDING DETECTION WHILE PLOTTING SOPHISTICATED ATTACKS
    Even if more American Muslims were to engage in homegrown terrorism, their attacks would likely fail either because of technical error or because authorities were able to discover their plots before they could be executed. Unlike the September 11 hijackers, American Muslim homegrown terrorists tend to be amateurs and often lack the basic skills of terrorist tradecraft. Moreover, opportunities to enhance their skills are limited. Technical information available online is often incomplete or poorly presented, and perfecting the skills to manufacture explosives and cultivate other expertise—including the ability to maintain operational security when preparing attacks and recruiting other militants—increases the risk of exposure. For these reasons, every attempted terrorist plot by American Muslims in the United States has ended in the arrests of the would-be perpetrators, with the exception of Shahzad and two others, Carlos Bledsoe and Maj. Nidal Hasan.
    In fact, the evidence suggests that engaging in terrorist activity in the United States carries a serious risk of exposure. First, although difficult to quantify, societal awareness about terrorism has grown considerably over the years. In October 2010, for example, members of a Hawaiian mosque reported to authorities a new member whose recent move to the area raised their suspicions. Contrast this with the hospitality and no-questions-asked reception that the Muslim community in San Diego gave to two of the September 11 hijackers in the months preceding the attacks. Additionally, over the past decade, alert citizens otherwise unacquainted with the would-be perpetrators have reported apparent terrorist activity involving American Muslims to authorities. Second, as the result of both a significant investment in grassroots counterterrorism efforts spanning the federal, state, and local levels as well as expanded prerogatives such as the availability of FBI assessments, would-be terrorists must contend with an increasingly sophisticated monitoring and investigative apparatus. Third, American Muslim communities have demonstrated a willingness to report aspiring terrorists in their midst—a dynamic that, according to several studies, has occurred in more than 20 percent of terrorism-related cases. Consider that Shahzad is the only homegrown Muslim terrorist unknown to authorities before he tried to execute his plot. Equally telling is why he failed: according to New York Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, Shahzad purposely fabricated his bomb with inferior-grade fertilizer to evade detection.
    RISKS OF EXAGGERATING THE THREAT
    Since September 11, American Muslims have executed two successful terrorist attacks in the United States—the Fort Hood shootings by Maj. Nidal Hasan in November 2009 and a lesser-known attack by Carlos Bledsoe on a U.S. Army recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, in June 2009. Although both cases could be cited as evidence of the dangers of "lone wolves," the small number of such attacks, despite their operational simplicity, suggests either that there are no aspiring terrorists in the country or that even plotters of simple terrorist attacks are being detected before they can harm Americans.
    Based on the evidence, the fear of a coming wave of Muslim homegrown terrorist attacks against the United States is greatly exaggerated. This fact deserves serious reflection given the considerable risks that can arise from mischaracterizing the threat. As the United States enters an era of fiscal austerity, officials must evaluate the opportunity costs of investing in domestic counterterrorism against other priorities. Consider, for example, how the FBI's shift in resources from white collar crime to counterterrorism after the September 11 attacks, as documented by the national media, reduced the agency's capacity to handle cases of mortgage and securities fraud at the height of the financial crisis. Additionally, the FBI has assigned dozens of agents to participate in recent sting operations. Government officials need to seriously consider whether these investments in domestic counterterrorism are worth the cost.
    For complete policy paper, click here

    Friday, December 16, 2011

    The Myth and Reality of Musharraf - Benazir Deal in 2007


    No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington
    Rice reveals all about Benazir-Musharraf NRO deal Says Musharraf was imposing martial
    Shaheen Sehbai, The NewsDecember 15, 2011
    WASHINGTON: The big official secret of the NRO deal, brokered by the United States between then President Pervez Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto, has been revealed in full detail by its sponsor, the former US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, in her memoirs published here.

    She admits everything and reveals all. In graphic detail, Condi has disclosed in her book, “No Higher Honor”, how she toiled for many sleepless nights to bring Musharraf and Benazir together in 2007.

    It is for the first time that any American leader has admitted, and so bluntly, that Washington had played the key role to bring the two “moderates”, Musharraf and Benazir, together and a deal was arranged. There have been a number of reports and wide speculation about who brokered the deal but never was this confirmed at such an authentic level.

    Coming at a time when President Zardari is seriously ill, Pak-US relations are at the lowest ebb, supplies to Nato are blocked and US has suspended $700 million in aid to Pakistan, the Condi Rice book will create many more problems for the ruling PPP.

    The disclosures also come at a time when the NRO has been squarely rejected and declared null and void by the Supreme Court of Pakistan and will now be seen how the detailed disclosures will affect the NRO verdicts which are yet to be implemented in full. The apex court is trying to get its verdicts on NRO implemented.

    Condoleezza Rice also reveals that Musharraf was hours away from imposing martial law on August 8, 2007 when she intervened and persuaded him not to do so. “You pulled it off,” President Bush complimented her a day later.

    But the real breaking news comes in her description of how she brought Benazir and Musharraf together. No one had any idea of her role in the NRO deal before she decided to spill all the beans in her book.

    At the beginning of 2007, she says, Musharraf had asked for help in bridging his differences with Bhutto, the powerful opposition leader who’d lived in self-imposed exile throughout his rule.
    For complete article, click here
    Related:
    Condoleezza Rice Look Back - New York Times

    A Good Primer on Islamic Political Parties of Pakistan

    Islamic Parties in Pakistan
    Asia Report N°21612 Dec 2011
     
    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

    The ability of Pakistan’s radical Islamic parties to mount limited but potentially violent opposition to the government has made democratic reform, and by extension the reduction of religious extremism and development of a more peace­ful and stable society, more challenging. This is a reflection of those parties’ well-organised activist base, which is committed to a narrow partisan agenda and willing to defend it through violence. While their electoral support remains limited, earlier Islamisation programs have given them a strong legal and political apparatus that enables them to influence policy far beyond their numerical strength. An analysis of party agendas and organisation, as well as other sources of influence in judicial, political and civil society institutions, is therefore vital to assessing how Pakistan’s main religious parties apply pressure on government, as well as the ability and willingness of the mainstream parties that are moderate on religious issues to resist that pressure.

    These parties’ ability to demonstrate support for their various agendas is an expression of coherent internal structures, policymaking processes and relations between the leadership and the rank-and-file. These aspects of party functioning are, therefore, as critical to understanding their role in the polity and prospects of influencing policy in the future as in understanding their relationship to the state.

    The Islamic parties that are the subject of this report might operate within the current political order, but their ultimate aim is to replace it with one that is based on narrow, discriminatory interpretations of Islam. They have also taken equivocal positions on militant jihad: on the one hand, they insist on their distinction from militant outfits by virtue of working peacefully and within the democratic system; on the other, they admit to sharing the ideological goal of enforcing Sharia (Islamic law), while maintaining sizeable mad­rasa and mosque networks that are breeding grounds for many extremist groups.

    Moreover, belying their claims of working peacefully, the major Islamic parties maintain militant wings, violent student organisations and ties to extremist groups, and have proved more than willing to achieve political objectives through force. After parlaying military support during the 1980s into significant political and legislative gains, and even absent military support and the electoral assistance that entailed, the parties have still been able to defend earlier gains through intimidation and violent agitation on the streets. In response, faced with their opposition, the mainstream moderate parties have often abandoned promised reforms while in government, or even made further concessions, such as the National Assembly’s constitutional amend­ment in 1974 declaring the Ahmadi sect non-Muslim.

    Such compromises have not offset the pressure of the ulama (religious scholars), as intended, but only emboldened religious hardliners.

    For complete report (pdf), click here

    Sunday, December 11, 2011

    The Global Message of Karbala



    History Lessons From Karbala
    By Dr. Hassan Abbas, AfPak Channel at Foreign Policy,

    The idea of defiance against tyranny and oppression owes a great deal to Hussain ibne Ali, the hero of the battle of Karbala in 680 AD. With just 72 valiant followers and family members, the grandson of Prophet Mohammad faced the military might of the Muslim empire ruled then by a despot, Yazid bin Mu‘awiya. Hussain refused to sanctify Yazid's reign through baya'a(allegiance) and consequently, he and his small contingent were martyred in the most brutal of fashions. The accompanying women and children were imprisoned for months in the dark alleys of Damascus.

    On every Ashura, the 10th day of the Muslim calendar month of Muharram (which fell on December 6 this year), many Muslims all across the world commemorate Hussain's great sacrifice, but tragically the central message of Karbala appears to evade the broader Muslim thinking today. In Western literature and research on Islam, this episode is often viewed through the lens of certain Shi'a rituals practiced on and around Ashura. It is worth probing why that is so. Even more importantly, it is critical to understand why terrorists and extremists like al-Qaeda and the Taliban often attack the Ashura related gatherings (as is evident from attacks in recent years in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan), and what is at the core of their disdain of all the things that Imam Hussain stood for.

    A brief historical reference is required to understand the context of Ashura. After Prophet Mohammad's death in 632 AD, the expansion of Islam became a global phenomenon, courtesy of a variety of means. Islam was a rising power in the world, but in the process, the fabric of Muslim society was also being transformed, as the Muslim outlook was gradually influenced by people from various cultures. New elites that were more interested in power and wealth alone started emerging as more influential, and consequently, Islam's emphasis on egalitarianism, justice and equity started getting diluted. A deliberate attempt to imitate the dynastic empires of the Byzantines and Sasanians was obvious to many observers at the time. The distortion of Islamic ideals became a favorite pastime of Yazid and his coterie. The expansion of influence by way of the sword was a hallmark of his times.

    Imam Hussain, the spiritual custodian of Islam at the time, staunchly stood against this shifting tide, and his unprecedented sacrifice was intended to shake the Muslim conscience and expose the misleading path introduced in the name of Islam. It was a matter of principle for him - one of human dignity and honor. Challenging the newly introduced monarchical system of government was another important feature of this struggle. In his last sermon before departing from Madina on his journey towards Karbala, Iraq, he made clear his mission: "I seek to reform the Ummah of my grandfather." An armed struggle for that purpose was never his intended route. He believed in conveying the message through love and compassion. It was a message motivated truly by humanity. The great Indian leader Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi aptly acknowledged this by saying: "I learned from Hussein how to achieve victory while being oppressed."

    This was not a mere political battle, though some Muslim historians try to project it that way so as to cover up not only Yazid's atrocities, but indirectly to defend his school of thought as well. The mainstream view, however, both among Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, is very sympathetic toward Imam Hussain. It would be an absolute travesty of Muslim history to call this a Sunni-Shi'a battle. Some writers still do that, either out of lack of in depth understanding, or in a flawed effort to simplify things for a lay Western reader. On the Muslim side, only a handful of controversial clerics project this version. Still, most Muslims shy away from digging too deep into the matter, and carefully avoid questioning the historical developments leading to the rise of Yazid.

    Insightfully, the whole narrative of tragedy at Karbala would have remained unheard of without the tireless struggle of Hussain's sister Zainab ibne Ali, who as an eyewitness of the tragedy propagated details of the event far and wide among Muslims. While in chains, she courageously challenged Yazid's policies on his face in his court in Damascus soon after the battle at Karbala. Many Muslims -- some out of ignorance and others out of bigotry --avoid appreciating the crucial role of a woman in this grand struggle. Zainab's contribution to fighting for the essence of the Muslim faith was as critical as that of Hussain.

    Though Shi'as are often at the forefront of commemorating the tragedy of Karbala, Sunnis, especially those belonging to Barelvi school of thought in South Asia and almost all Sufi circles in broader Asia and Middle East, also enthusiastically participate in paying homage to Imam Hussain and his companions. Extremists and terrorists among Muslims want to destroy this element of unity, as sectarianism suits their divisive and violent agenda. Distorting religion to make it dogmatic in outlook and regressive in approach is also what helps them achieve their goals exceedingly well. For them, political power is an end in itself. Hussain's message stands completely contrary to this perspective.

    For complete article, click here
    This article was also carried by Institute for Social Policy and Understanding and The American Muslim websites.

    For background, see The Story of Karbala: Imam Hussain and His Great Sacrifice and Lessons From Karbala: Islamic History's Most Tragic Episode


    Afghan Shiites who were taking part in a religious ceremony at a shrine in
    Kabul on Tuesday were attacked by a suicide bomber.
    Also See: Rare Attacks on Shiites Kill Scores in Afghanistan - New York Times

    Friday, December 02, 2011

    U.S. Aid to Pakistan: Is it producing desired results?

    Why Pakistan still needs U.S. assistance
    By Jane Harman and and Robert M. Hathaway, 
    Washington Post, December 1, 2011

    Pakistan will soon have the fifth-largest population in the world. It already has the seventh-largest army and is close to overtaking Britain as the fifth-largest nuclear power. The country’s location, demographic heft, military might, nuclear weapons capability and links to Islamist terrorists ensure that it will remain central to U.S. interests even after NATO forces depart Afghanistan.

    In other words, as much as some might like it to be otherwise, writing Pakistan out of the U.S. foreign policy script is not an option. This is true even in the aftermath of last weekend’s NATO airstrikes that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, triggering yet another crisis in the tortured U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

    Two years ago, when one of us served in Congress, there was robust debate over the nature of the U.S. relationship with Pakistan — the need for more civilian control, especially over the nuclear arsenal, and Islamabad’s failure to crack down on corruption and domestic extremists. The debate culminated in President Obama signing the Kerry-Lugar-Berman (KLB) Act, committing the United States to provide $1.5 billion in annual economic assistance for the next five years.

    Fierce opposition from the supercharged Pakistani media over questions of sovereignty threatened to derail the bill, which sought to reorient a predominantly military relationship into a long-term civilian-based partnership. In passing KLB, Congress wagered that, by investing in Pakistan’s political and economic development, the United States could play a small but meaningful role in creating a prosperous, tolerant and inclusive nation that would be a force for peace and stability throughout South Asia.

    Today, the United States still struggles to fashion an effective program of civilian aid. Many Pakistanis claim they see no evidence of U.S. economic assistance. Others contend that the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad has poorly managed the program, imposing “Made in America” solutions on Pakistani problems. Some question whether KLB reflects Pakistani priorities or an U.S. agenda that may be harmful to Pakistani interests.

    For complete article, click here

    For Woodrow Wilson Centre's New Report: AIDING WITHOUT ABETTING, click here