Thursday, June 28, 2007

Who Holds the Cards in Pakistan?



Memo From Islamabad
As Pakistan’s Chief Looks Ahead, Army Holds the Cards
By CARLOTTA GALL: New York Times, June 28, 2007

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Speculation has been rife in political circles recently that Pakistan’s president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, may not survive his wrangle with the chief justice and hold on to power, but a great silence emanates from the one place that may count the most: the barracks and the mess halls of the armed forces, the other great part of Pakistan’s ruling equation.

What the army thinks about the political logjam, and what it decides to do in the event of continuing stalemate, instability or violence, will be the defining factor in General Musharraf’s future, most commentators agree.

If and when the army feels it is being damaged by its association with General Musharraf, and his insistence on retaining the dual posts of president and chief of army staff, they will act to safeguard the reputation of the army, they say.

Historians and columnists have been outlining the precedents, recalling how Pakistan’s three previous military rulers exited from power. None of the departures came in happy circumstances, and none bode well for General Musharraf, who took power in a bloodless coup in 1999.

The longest ruling general, Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, who seized power in 1977, died in 1988 in a plane crash, the cause of which still remains a mystery.

The strongest possibility is that the plane was brought down using a bomb. But according to one theory, the plane crashed after the crew was disabled by knockout gas hidden inside crates of mangoes — a gift that was put on board the presidential plane at the last minute. This being the mango season, the old story has gained a lot of currency lately. “He either goes the mango-crate way or he goes gracefully,” one military officer said.

Pakistan’s other two military dictators in its turbulent 60 years since independence were forced out by fellow officers. Gen. Mohammad Ayub Khan, who ruled from 1958 to 1969, was isolated, unpopular and sick by the end, and after months of popular unrest was replaced by another military man, Gen. Yahya Khan.

General Yahya Khan promised a return to democracy and held probably the fairest elections Pakistan has ever seen. But after war and the breakup of Pakistan in 1971, when Bangladesh gained independence, his fellow officers forced him to resign and hand over rule of what remained of Pakistan to the civilian political leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

General Musharraf, the fourth military ruler of Pakistan, has already survived several attempts on his life, and with suicide bombing on the rise, and Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the hills, the possibility of assassination remains — even if he should step down.

But the general is showing no readiness to give up either of his posts, president or chief of army staff, though the terms for both jobs expire toward the end of the year. In a recent interview, he said that after a life in the army, his uniform was like a second skin to him.

But if his stubbornness is met with more demonstrations, challenges in the courts and possibly civil unrest, the army command will grow increasingly concerned.

Well aware of the importance of backing within the army, General Musharraf called a meeting of his corps commanders and principal military staff recently, apparently to ensure their support. The military public relations service issued an unusually long news release in that vein.

“The Corps Commanders and Principal Staff Officers of the Pakistan Army affirmed to stand committed for the security of their country under the leadership and guidance of the President and the COAS,” it read, referring to the chief of army staff.

Issuing such a statement is unusual and brings to mind the vote of confidence that often presages the end for a cabinet officer or, in sports, a manager or coach. In effect, several former members of the army said, such assurances only underscore the general’s insecurity.

The military officer said he had not seen a commander calling for such a statement of support in more than 30 years in the army. “The statement was a mistake,” he said.

“The army is not a political party,” he said. “People do not have to swear support for their leader.” An army officer takes an oath to uphold the Constitution, not his commander, he added.

A veteran opposition politician, Enver Baig, was more definitive. “The military backing he had, has definitely eroded,” he said, speaking of General Musharraf. The discontent with General Musharraf is seeping into the lower ranks as well. “The midlevel officers are becoming restless,” said Ayesha Siddiqa, a military analyst and author of a recent book on the military’s enormous economic clout that has angered the military leadership.

In the North-West Frontier Province there is growing frustration among military and intelligence officials over the rising lawlessness of Taliban militants, and the president’s apparent lack of concern and direction, senior officials say.

The National Security Council, which considered the problem in early June, promised more police officers and resources. Meanwhile, military officers no longer feel comfortable going around Peshawar in uniform, said one former officer from the province.

Even in the capital, army officers say they can feel the changing mood. The military officer described driving in Islamabad and seeing someone holding up a placard showing a big army boot stamping on a map of Pakistan. “That is a very poor reflection,” he said. “It is hatred that is building in the civilian level against the army.”

Faced with such discontent, the mood in the military is not for another general to take over, but for the country to restore civilian rule, he and several former members of the military said.

But who will tell the general to go? After nearly eight years in power, General Musharraf has personally picked all the top military and intelligence leaders. He will remain secure as long as he retains the support of four or five of the nine corps commanders, Ms. Siddiqa said.

Military officers, especially senior ones coming up for promotion or retirement and eager to keep the privileges they have earned, will not speak out of line to the chief of army staff, the officer said.

The officer said he could sense growing dissatisfaction among fellow officers, but discipline was such that no one was voicing it. “They don’t say it,” he said. “From their eyes you can see it.”

Asked if the corps commanders might tell the general he had to go, he answered, “We may be coming to that stage.”

Flooding in Pakistan

More than 800,000 stricken in wake of Pakistan flooding
The Associated Press June 28, 2007 (Published in International HErald Tribune)

TURBAT, Pakistan: Helicopters dropped relief supplies to some of the more than 800,000 people hit by monsoon flooding in southwest Pakistan, as flash floods killed 20 in an area bordering Afghanistan, officials said.

Many of those affected were stranded in high open areas or on roofs in Baluchistan province following Cyclone Yemyin.

Twenty people died in flash floods Thursday in the northwestern Khyber Agency tribal region, said government official Ilyas Khan.

The total number of lives lost in the unusually severe flooding is still unknown.

Floods have also ravaged four eastern provinces of neighboring Afghanistan, causing at least four deaths, a NATO statement said.

NATO troops and Afghan police rescued 42 trapped villagers in Kapisa province Wednesday. Flooding was also reported in the provinces of Kabul, Parwan and Kunar, where four died Tuesday when the Pech River overran its banks.

Monsoon storms have claimed more than 120 lives in neighboring India.

U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed deep concern and reaffirmed the U.N.'s readiness to help, spokeswoman Michele Montas said in New York.

In Pakistan, the army took over relief operations, using helicopters and C130 transport planes to reach areas needing help most.

Khubah Bakhsh, the provincial relief commissioner, estimated that 200,000 houses had been destroyed or damaged.

He said more than 800,000 people have been affected by the floods.

The cyclone struck Baluchistan's coast Tuesday, killing at least 12 people, provincial government spokesman Raziq Bugti said earlier.

Others were believed lost in the Arabian Sea, but no estimates were available.

Bakhsh said an accurate, updated death toll was impossible, with many telephone links cut.

In one of the hardest-hit areas — Turbat city and surrounding villages — the first relief supplies only began arriving about 48 hours after the cyclone hit, driving the mayor to resign and angry residents to protest.

"We have been saved from the flood, but we may die of starvation," said Mohammed Kash, a teacher at a rural school.

From a helicopter, an Associated Press reporter saw only the tops of palm trees protruding from vast sheets of water in some areas.

People, cows and goats were stranded on rooftops without water or food, in sweltering 43-degree Centigrade (109-degree Fahrenheit) heat.

Ex-army officers train bureaucrats

Ex-army officers train bureaucrats
By Azaz Syed: Daily Times, June 29, 2007

ISLAMABAD: Top training institutions for bureaucrats are headed by retired military officers, Daily Times has learnt.

A report has been submitted to the National Assembly Secretariat in reply to a question raised by MNA Dr Farid Ahmed Piracha. It has disclosed that Maj Gen (r) Sikandar Shami is the director general of the Civil Services Academy (SCA), Lahore. The SCA is a unique academy where all newly selected bureaucrats are trained.

National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA), where officers get training before being promoted from grade 18 to 19, is run by retired army officers, says the report.

Maj Gen (r) Khalid Naeem is the director general of NIPA Karachi, Air Commodore (r) Shaukat Haider director general of NIPA Quetta and Maj Gen (r) Akbar Saeed Awan is the director general of NIPA Peshawar.

Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) has also been run by retired military generals over the years. Currently, Lt Gen (r) Shahid Hamid is its chairman. The retired military officer is also the chairman of the Central Selection Board (CSB), which selects the officers of grade 19, 20 and 21 and recommends the promotion into grade 22.

Pakistan Administrative Staff College, Lahore, is the top training institute for the officers waiting for promotion from grade 21 to grade 22. This institution is headed by Lt Gen (r) Javed Hassan according to the report.

US House Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearing on Dr. AQ Khan

June 27th - - US House of Representatives Foreign Relations Committee - Mark Fitzpatrick's testimony
Nuclear Black Markets: Can we win the game of catch-up with determined proliferators?

‘Khan network no longer exists’
From Khalid Hasan: Daily Times, June 29, 2007

WASHINGTON: Experts testifying before a congressional committee on Wednesday agreed that the AQ Khan network “is no longer in existence”.

The hearing by the subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, headed by Gerry Ackerman of New York, and the subcommittee on terrorism, nonproliferation and trade, was devoted to the theme: US policy and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The three witnesses who presented testimonies and answered questions were: David Albright of the Institute of Science and Technology, Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London and Lisa Curtis of the Heritage Foundation.

Under persistent questioning by members of the committee wanting to know if the AQ Khan network has been effectively wrapped up, the experts were in accord on the point that the network is no longer operative. In its most functional and active stage, there were about 40 to 50 people involved in its operations in Pakistan and abroad and the Dubai end is still in existence. In answer to a question, one of the experts said that Dr Khan’s motivation appeared to be financial rather than ideological.

David Albright, one of the leading authorities in Washington on nuclear proliferation and related areas, said it had not been confirmed that it was the Saudi Kingdom that had financed Pakistan’s nuclear programme. However, there could be an understanding that Pakistan would aid Saudi Arabia if called upon to do so, but there was no evidence that Pakistan had supplied nuclear weapons or nuclear know-how to Saudi Arabia. One expert said these nuclear weapons were Pakistan’s “crown jewels” and “we’ve some confidence that Pakistan is committed to protect them.”

The members of the committee, with the exception of Sheila Jackson-Lee, were openly hostile to Pakistan during their individual presentations and in their questioning of the three experts. Ackerman found it ironic that the “stiffest penalty” the Pakistani government could impose on those who sell its “nuclear crown jewels” is house arrest.

Congressman Ed Royce of California said Pakistan owes more to the world than it had so far revealed. He also accused Dr Khan of “stealing” nuclear technology from Holland. One member said that the Pakistan government was “complicit” in the Khan network. He also urged direct access to Dr Khan. Another member said it was not possible to transport nuclear equipment in a C-130 aircraft without the knowledge of army command.

Role of Army in Pakistan

Army said to control all segments of Pakistani society
By Khalid Hasan: Daily Times, June 28, 2007

WASHINGTON: Under General Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistan Army has made deep inroads into every facet of life, suggests a long report published in the Washington Post on Wednesday.

The report, filed from the village of Daulat Nagar near Kharian by the newspaper’s Pakistan-based correspondent, quotes one Dr Nusrat Riaz who complains that the clinic he has run for three years has been sent an administrator “to look over his shoulder,” though he has no medical background, no experience in supervising doctors and who, in addition, is “functionally illiterate”. He is from the army. It is not clear if the officer is still serving or retired. The report notes that under Gen Musharraf, the military has “quietly exerted its influence over nearly every segment of Pakistani society. Active-duty or retired officers now occupy most key government jobs, including posts in education, agriculture and medicine that have little to do with defence. The military also dominates the corporate world; it reportedly runs a $20 billion portfolio of businesses from banks to real estate developers to bakeries. And everywhere lurks the hand of the feared military-led intelligence services.”

The present campaign for judicial independence in Pakistan is said to have “exploded into a full-fledged movement to oust the armed services from civilian life and send the generals back to their barracks. They are not expected to go easily, and the wealth and influence they have attained during the Musharraf era helps explain why.”

The Post quotes lawyer and opposition figure Zafarullah Khan as saying, “Ultimately the question is: Who gets to rule? Sixteen generals or 160 million people? Sooner or later we have to decide that once and for all.” Gen Musharraf’s rule has been different from that of his predecessors, with soldiers a rare sight on the nation’s streets, and “yet the military’s imprint is everywhere,” says the report.

Intelligence agencies, the report says, are active. Zafrullah Khan told the correspondent that he received a phone call in the small hours of the morning that said, “We’ve purchased your coffin.” Another caller said, “Get ready for Pakistan’s Tiananmen Square.” The second call is hard to believe as a question mark hangs over Pakistani intelligence operatives’ familiarity with recent Chinese history.

“With Musharraf fighting for his political survival, the military has begun pushing back against what top officers call a ‘malicious campaign’ against the state.” The report notes that three months earlier, Gen Musharraf “enjoyed widespread popularity, owing in part to his decision to replace civilian leaders who were seen as corrupt and inefficient with military leaders who presented themselves as disciplined and moral”. However, the mood shifted dramatically on March 9 with the sacking of the chief justice. That message has filtered down to the streets of Pakistan, and it seems to resonate with a diverse group of Pakistanis. The army’s close ties with the United States at a time of growing anti-Americanism here have not helped its image, the report adds.

On Tuesday, the Washington Post published a letter from one Kalyan Singhal from Columbia, Maryland, who said Pakistan stands at the centre of four markets with more than two billion people and a combined annual gross domestic product close to $20 trillion. If Pakistan makes certain strategic changes, in 40 years it could have the highest per capita income in the world outside North America, Western Europe and Japan. The Pakistan Army, which does not wish to give up its privileges, the letter writer noted, “attracts the best and the brightest”. Any plan for Pakistan’s future, he suggested, must ensure that army personnel maintain their privileges. Pakistan should make peace with India and reduce the size of its army by two-thirds and use the savings to build its infrastructure, giving the demobilised personnel the responsibility for this work in exchange for maintaining or even enhancing their privileges. “This will allow Pakistan’s president, Gen Pervez Musahrraf, to become a civilian president and create an opening for his predecessors Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to lead parliament, with one of them as prime minister and the other as leader of the opposition.”

NATO Strikes in Pakistan's Tribal Areas

NATO Strikes Taliban Militants in Pakistani Territory
Terrorism Focus, Volume 4, Issue 20 (June 26, 2007), Jamestown Foundation
By Hassan Abbas

The covert understanding between the Pakistani government and NATO/ISAF in Afghanistan regarding direct U.S. military action in Pakistan's tribal areas is hardly a secret anymore. Officially, the Pakistani government forbids foreign troops from conducting military operations on its soil, whereas in reality many U.S. missile attacks are coordinated with Pakistan beforehand. At times, it appears that the United States acts without informing Pakistan, but the Pakistani government always claims otherwise in order to protect its domestic credibility (The News, June 20). The unraveling of this relationship could not have occurred at a worse time for Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, as he currently faces the toughest challenge of his presidency in the shape of growing political unrest in the country. Two aerial attacks last week in Pakistan's Waziristan region illustrate the complexities involved in fighting the Taliban insurgency.

On June 19, about two dozen people were killed when a missile hit a madrassa in Datakhel area of North Waziristan agency (Dawn, June 20). Pakistani Army spokesperson Major General Waheed Arshad was quick to declare that "a group of militants were making explosives and there was an explosion," giving the impression that it was an accident at a terrorist training facility. The coalition spokesman in Kabul, Colonel David Accetta, confirmed that "we have no indications that we have fired anything across the border into Pakistan." In a matter of hours, however, it became obvious from press reports that a missile strike had occurred.

The second incident occurred on June 24 near the shared border. NATO spokespersons confirmed that their forces unknowingly tracked rebels into Pakistani territory and killed more than 10 civilians. While apologizing for the loss of innocent lives, a NATO spokesperson clearly maintained that "the strikes had been carried out in coordination with the Pakistani military" (The News, June 25). Pakistan quickly denied this, but few are ready to believe it—this is most likely a reflection of diminishing public trust in Musharraf's government.

Demonstrating Musharraf's domestic struggles, two mullahs allegedly aligned with Musharraf and the military delivered synchronized statements after these attacks. Maulana Abdul Aziz, of Lal Masjid (Red Mosque), who has lately made a name for himself through daytime kidnappings, asked the youth of the country to prepare for jihad, and he also called on the government to be mindful of Islamic honor and give up its cooperation with the United States (Khabrain, June 25). Maulana Fazlur Rahman of Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam took a similar line (Khabrain, June 25). A notable Waziri tribal elder, Malik Sher Khan, however, offered a more independent view when he blamed the Pakistani government for its dual policies in the tribal region and accused it of supporting pro-Taliban groups for its political agenda (Frontier Post, June 25).

The positions of Musharraf and of NATO are divergent. If Pakistan and NATO cannot coordinate basic official statements, what can be expected of them in terms of joint military operations and cooperation vis-à-vis intelligence sharing and sensitivity to each other's core concerns? Taliban ascendance and their expansionist designs are too serious of a matter to be left to military commanders in the field. A political dialogue involving all major stakeholders in the area might open new avenues to fight this growing problem and help develop levels of trust between Pakistani and NATO forces.

Pakistan's general problem

Pakistan's general problem
Popular resistance to Musharraf's rule has seemingly caught the U.S. off-guard.
By Ali Dayan Hasan
ALI DAYAN HASAN is South Asia researcher for Human Rights Watch.
Los Angeles Times, June 27, 2007

IN RETURN FOR cooperation in the war on terror since 9/11, the United States has provided Pakistan's military ruler, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, with billions of dollars in aid and almost total support in his quest to remain president — until recently.

Eight years after seizing power in a coup, Musharraf is trying to grab five more years through political manipulation and blatant coercion. However, even as he rewrote it, the Pakistani Constitution prohibits him from being president unless he stops being army chief.

That would normally be a minor irritant, easily ignored. But the ground is shifting under Musharraf's feet. Pakistanis are turning out in mass demonstrations led by lawyers whose tolerance for Musharraf has been replaced with a newfound regard for the rule of law. The slogan on the street: "The U.S. has a pet dog in Pakistan — he wears a uniform."

One cause of this turnabout is Musharraf's clumsy attempt to fire the country's chief justice, Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, in March. The judge has had the temerity to rule against the government in key cases, so in an election year, he could not be trusted to legitimize Musharraf's bid to remain president.

Musharraf's difficulties have caught the Bush administration flat-footed. But his fall from grace should not have come as a surprise. The general's rule has seen the Pakistani military engage in abuse, brutality and greed. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Musharraf's political adversaries have disappeared. Some, as Human Rights Watch has documented, have been sent to secret CIA-controlled detention facilities. But many more, unconnected to the war on terror, remain in the hands of the Pakistani military's feared Inter-Services Intelligence agency.

Pakistani journalists are regularly threatened, beaten and tortured — and several have been killed. Moderate political parties, which command an overwhelming share of the popular vote, have seen their leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, hounded into exile. Political activists have been harassed and jailed for not accepting Musharraf's supremacy. Such brutal repression has triggered an insurgency in mineral-rich Baluchistan province and helped push the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan into the embrace of the Taliban.

Yet the Bush administration, fearful of radical Islamists, has rebuffed experts who have urged a return to civilian rule in Pakistan.

There were signs of change. On June 12, the U.S. finally challenged the Musharrafian construction of democracy. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack pointed out that the general had pledged to "put aside" his uniform and that the U.S. expected him to "follow through on his commitments." Washington also dispatched Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher to Pakistan, where he met with opposition leaders and called for free elections.

But within days, McCormack seemed to be eating his words, declaring Musharraf an agent for "positive change" in Pakistan. "He is the one who had pledged to resolve this issue of the uniform and holding civilian office," McCormack said. "It's not a condition of the United States. It's a self-imposed condition by President Musharraf."

The United States should stop fearing the future without a general in charge in Pakistan and come out unequivocally in support of democracy. Radical Islam would not win the day if Musharraf were coaxed into retirement. Islamists have never polled more than 12% of the vote in national elections.

The Pakistani military has a long and well-documented history of prioritizing its economic empire, estimated to be worth at least $20 billion, over any ideological considerations. Paid by the U.S., it nurtured radical Islam in the 1980s to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan — and then embraced just as quickly the opportunity to be paid to dismantle the same. Of course, putting that genie back in the bottle has proved difficult, but the effort guarantees continued U.S. political engagement and financial aid. Musharraf's successors — military and civilian — are unlikely to want to commit economic and political suicide by adopting radical Islamism.

It is time for the U.S. to insist on a return to civilian rule through free and fair elections, for which the return and participation of Pakistan's exiled political leaders are a prerequisite. Musharraf must take off his uniform and restore the presidency to its largely ceremonial constitutional role in a parliamentary democracy. Only then can he legitimately run for president by seeking election from a truly representative parliament.

As things stand, Pakistan's army, judiciary, political parties and even civil society are sullied by their association with Musharraf. The country must return to genuine civilian rule for these institutions to renew themselves and assume their rightful role in a healthy democracy.

If the Bush administration actually believes its high-minded rhetoric about the spread of democracy, there is no better place to start than Pakistan.

Wednesday, June 27, 2007

How the US Media Portrayed Pakistan after 9/11

Jumping on the US Bandwagon for a “War on Terror”
Major US newspapers struggle to eliminate bias and exaggerations in their reports on terror
Susan Moeller: YaleGlobal, 21 June 2007

Summary: Since the 9/11 attacks, a US priority has been to eliminate global terror. The US has spent and accrued billions in debt, invading Afghanistan and Iraq and enhancing security procedures in travel and everyday routine. A study of newspaper coverage of Pakistan, following the 9/11 attacks, suggests that journalists, either willingly or unwittingly, contributed to overall public confusion regarding global terrorism. Susan Moeller, director of the International Center for Media and the Public Agenda and author of the study “The ‘Good’ Muslims: US Newspaper Coverage of Pakistan” points to some trends of bias in reports. For example, journalists often use words such as militant, extremist and terrorist interchangeably, discounting distinctions in motives, politics or history. Rather than inform, newspapers stoke fear among readers. Moeller urges newspapers and readers to reflect on the many economic and political motivations behind official Washington admonitions that huge expenditures can protect against a fragmented and elusive threat.

WASHINGTON: When reporters from non-American news outlets write about the Bush administration’s “War on Terror,” they typically place the words in quotation marks to indicate a distance from the White House’s political rhetoric. But most mainstream media in the US use the phrase as generically as the words World War II or the Vietnam War.

Behind those missing little bits of punctuation lies the story of how the top newspapers in the United States helped obfuscate the real nature of events post-9/11. A study, titled “The ‘Good’ Muslims: US Newspaper Coverage of Pakistan,” found patterns of coverage in major US newspapers in the year following September 11, 2001, and five years later in 2006 that may still contribute to public confusion over the perception of the global terrorist risk.

“The ‘Good’ Muslims” investigated the reporting of that “other” major theater in the “War on Terror” – Pakistan and Afghanistan – and discovered that American journalists too often failed to challenge the president’s representation of the dimensions and immediacy of the terrorist threat. The language that the White House chose to tell its story was the default way the events were described. And the papers’ use of American officials as their key sources further reinforced the Bush administration’s politicized packaging of events.

For Complete Report, click here

For Daily Times' Story on the subject, click here

Tuesday, June 26, 2007

Lal Masjid theatrics: mob rule or 'topi drama'?

Lal Masjid theatrics: mob rule or 'topi drama'?
By Prof Adil Najam: The News, June 26, 2007

The standoff created by the attack on a 'massage' centre in Islamabad by the Lal Masjid militia and the abduction of a number of Chinese nationals lasted less than a day. The criminality of this shameful act notwithstanding, the matter was thankfully resolved and the 'pious posse' from Jamia Faridia and Jamia Hafsa released the kidnapped individuals. However, far from resolving the larger crisis of puritanical vigilantism, this episode has only deepened it. The government has succumbed, yet again, to the militant tactics of the Lal Masjid leadership who have, in turn, declared victory. This episode will further embolden the already violence-prone brigands at the two madressahs and we are likely to see an escalation in their demands as well as their tactics. Meanwhile, with the government has once again demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to act decisively. The much-cherished 'writ of the state' continues to rot in tatters.

This loss of control by the state apparatus -- not only in the far reaches of the tribal belt but in the very heart of the federal capital -- is much more than a spiralling 'law and order' situation; it is an erosion of state sovereignty. The militants from Lal Masjid have been acting not just with impunity, but in equality to state functionaries. With all the pretensions of a state within a state, Lal Masjid 'authorities' are now negotiating as equals with government 'authorities.' And they have been doing so with increasing frequency and with amazing success.

What is even more surprising than the abdication of control by the state is the lack of outright outrage amongst the public. Somehow our national passions are far more likely to be flared by the award of meaningless honours to unimpressive novelists by foreign governments thousands of miles away than by the spectacle of crumbling state sovereignty in the very heart of our national capital. This lack of public outcry is partly -- but only partly -- explained by the political savvy of the Lal Masjid leadership. Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi and his comrades have shown great ingenuity in their choice of issues and in operational execution. By focusing on issues of public morality and highlighting the government's failures in enforcing its own laws, they have been able to present themselves as reformers rather than as bullies and as guardians of social virtue rather than as promoters of intolerance.

Much more than that -- and even amongst those who fully recognise the gravity of situation -- one finds a pervasive feeling that there is more to the Lal Masjid theatrics than meets the eye. Even members of parliament have been suggesting that the government and its intelligence agencies are manipulating the Lal Masjid militancy. There is a widely held view that even if the intelligence agencies are not actively 'managing' the Lal Masjid, the government is choosing to tolerate and possibly encourage its antics for its own short-term goals. The common refrain is that everything happening at the Lal Masjid is part of an elaborate 'topi drama' -- an intricate, carefully calibrated, stage-managed confrontation which is not a confrontation at all.

But why would the government (either directly or through its intelligence agencies) collude with the leadership of the Lal Masjid to produce or tolerate situations -- the continuing capture of a children's library, abduction of alleged brothel workers, hostage taking of policemen, and now the kidnapping of Chinese nationals -- that are clearly embarrassments for the government? That the government, despite all the instruments of force at its command, has been repeatedly caving in to the demands of the stick-totting madrassah students has fuelled rumours of secret deals and devious deceptions. But it also makes the Lal Masjid crowd look like heroes even as the government comes out looking ineffectual.

What possible benefits does the government derive that would outweigh this embarrassment? Two reasons are commonly given. First, there is the theory of domestic payoff. It is argued that strategically timed eruptions from Lal Masjid can provide valuable respite and distraction from other irksome political crises, especially the continuing saga of the chief justice debacle. The second theory posits the possibility of international payoffs. In this case, the argument is that since each eruption from the Lal Masjid is quickly contained, but never fully resolved, the military regime is sending a message to its US patrons that (a) Pakistan remains a country at the brink of fundamentalist fervour and (b) military control is needed to keep such militant groups in check.

Even if there were some in the realm of power who once actually believed in such ideas, neither of these theories is empirically defensible today. In relation to the first, it is now abundantly evident that Lal Masjid woes add to, instead of distracting from, the domestic political mess. Quite clearly, nothing that has happened by or in the Lal Masjid has made even the slightest dent in the public or media enthusiasm for following the minutia of the chief justice story. The second theory stands equally discredited. Instead of viewing the Lal Masjid skirmishes as evidence of just how bad things are in Pakistan, most analysts in Washington now see this unending drama as proof that the military government is increasingly unable to contain the rebirth of Talibanism in Pakistan. In short, the continuation of the Lal Masjid crisis is not merely an embarrassment for the government, it is actually dangerous for the regime; both domestically and internationally.

I am, of course, not privy to the inner thinking of the intelligence apparatchiks in Pakistan. However, it is at least likely that this is less of a 'topi drama' than people seem to believe. That whatever the relationship between intelligence agencies and the Lal Masjid might have been in the past, today the 'movement' (as Maulana Ghazi likes to call it) has assumed a life all its own as a very potent -- and ugly -- manifestation of self-sustaining vigilantism and mob rule. If so, the government's inaction against this 'movement' can be explained either as a gross miscalculation of the lurking dangers, or it could be based on a real fear that touching the hornets nest at Lal Masjid would unleash demons so horrific that our already divided society will be further torn apart. The government's own statements suggest that it is the latter.

Just like standing still in the middle of the road at the sight of the blinding lights of a truck speeding towards it does not save the life of the stunned deer, doing nothing about this escalating crisis out of fear that doing anything will only make things worse is not going to help the government, or Pakistan. Something needs to be done, and done fast.

Contrary to popular logic, there may be important payoffs for the government if it does act to judiciously dismantle militancy at Lal Masjid. Internationally, it will be seen as an important victory and a real step against rising Talibanisation. Domestically, it will mean one less crisis to worry about and could rally support from the moderate majority in Pakistan who once supported General Musharraf but have now become disenchanted. Ultimately, however, the most important reason to dismantle the militancy is that it is the right thing to do.

The writer is a professor of International Negotiation and Diplomacy at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, US, and the founding editor of Pakistaniat.com Email: adil.najam@ tufts.edu

Role of Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan

Agencies ruling the roost since Oct 1999
By Tariq Butt: The NEws, June 26, 2007

ISLAMABAD: Who runs the government that rules Pakistan since October 2002? Civilians, they say. But who will believe it?

All principal decisions taken since October 1999 and after the restoration of democracy of a unique nature, special to Pakistan, in October 2002 throw up the role of premier intelligence agencies and their chiefs as the solitary decisive factor.

This mighty state structure had little dominant role in the decision-making process when Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto had ruled twice each. Then, the involvement of the federal cabinet and the ruling party, obviously comprising civilians alone, was ensured, maybe at times to a limited extent. The “kitchen cabinets”, of the two prime ministers, consisting of small bands of their confidantes, used to take vital decisions.

But for three years from 1999 to 2002 and after the last general elections, the intelligence agencies had performed an unquestionable overriding role in every major decision the government has taken. The process of consultations has been too restricted and the participation of the civilian stakeholders of the dispensation has been absent.

The role of the spymasters in dropping the latest bombshell — filing of a reference against Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry — that took the nation by storm and shook President Pervez Musharraf and the entire applecart he is leading, was extremely critical and beyond an iota of doubt. The reliance of the present top man, like his uniformed predecessors, on the intelligence agencies has been immense and plays the most singular role in his decision-making. It is through the intelligence work that he gets the job done and relies on the conclusions of the spymasters.

The Military Intelligence (MI) and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) are directly answerable to Musharraf by virtue of his position as chief of the Army staff. There had been several instances when the ISI had not been properly reporting to previous prime ministers, who had publicly complained to the effect more than once. Benazir Bhutto’s successful attempt to have her choice nominee as ISI chief was not of much help to her as the agency hardly cooperated to the extent she had desired. Lt-Gen (retd) Hamid Gul, as ISI chief, during her tenure, used to boldly speak against the prime minister of the day.

The intelligence agencies’ role did not end with the creation of the judicial mess. They had been very active in the damage control exercise so that the crisis turns out to be favourable to the boss at the end of the day. Hardly any member of the civilian setup has been trusted as being capable of stemming the erosion at the public level.

Another a huge decision in which no member of the civilian dispensation had any role whatsoever related to the handling of eminent nuclear scientist, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan. After Musharraf was shown the allegedly illegal activities of the Pakistani hero in 2003, it all has been an intelligence agencies’ affair.

There has also been no civilian involvement of even a minor nature in the anti-terror campaign even after the restoration of “democracy.” It is a Pakistan army affair, being carried out by the support of the intelligence agencies. Even elected representatives become aware of sketchy details of operations when these are made public mostly by foreign media. However, credit goes to the ruling MPs that they have never put any questions.

Sometimes, successive prime ministers had been under tremendous pressure from their MPs on certain policy matters. It also happened that the premiers had to cancel their decisions after they found great resistance from their parliamentary parties. An apt example was Nawaz Sharif’s retreat when he had firmed up his plan to enforce Shariah to become a kind of Amirul Momineen. Khurshid Kasuri, then affiliated with the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), was one of the vocal opponents of his prime minister’s decision. Nawaz Sharif not only heard, though angrily, Kasuri’s hard-hitting outburst, but also had not expelled him from the party.

Had the intelligence agencies not worked hard as they did prior to the October 2002 general elections, formation of the king’s party (Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain-led PML) would have remained a mere unfulfilled dream. The agencies, comprehensively aided by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), midwife the PML that won the next elections and which is ruling since then. Creation of this party was no doubt beyond the capacity, power and capability of any politician, siding with the Musharraf government.

It was none but the intelligence agencies that single-handedly handled Nawaz Sharif’s departure into exile in December 2000. But at that time, there was pure military rule. Tackling of the yearlong forceful campaign run by Begum Kalsoom Nawaz including the lifting of her car in the air to stop her from leading a procession from Lahore to Peshawar was also solely dealt with by the intelligence agencies.

But even after the restoration of democracy, especially suiting Pakistan, secret talks are being conducted mainly by intelligence officials to work out a deal. The civilian government and the ruling coalition are not aware of the precise details of the now on, now off dialogue. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz is not a person, who has the habit of grudging or complaining. He is content with the room he has been provided to operate.

Opium Production in Afghanistan Soars



Afghan opium production 'soars'
By Imogen Foulkes; BBC News, Geneva ; June 25, 2007

Opium production in Afghanistan is soaring out of control, the annual UN report on illegal drugs says.

The World Drug Report says more than 90% of illegal opium, which is used to make heroin, comes from Afghanistan.

It says cultivation of opium poppies increased dramatically in the country, despite the presence of more than 30,000 international troops there.

The report says Afghanistan is unlikely to regain real security until the production of illegal drugs is tackled.

In the 1980s, Afghanistan produced some 30% of the world's opium, but now that figure has more than tripled, the UN document says.

It says that Helmand province alone cultivates almost half the world's illegal opium.

Thomas Pietschmann, the report's author, says production in Helmand has now outstripped that of entire countries.

"The province of Helmand itself is around 70,000 hectares under cultivation, which is three times the total area under cultivation in Myanmar (Burma).

"So only one province, three times as important as the whole of Myanmar, the second-largest opium-producing country," Mr Pietschmann says.

The report says that while global co-ordination of drug law enforcement has improved, traffickers of heroin from Afghanistan and of cocaine from Colombia are now targeting new routes in Africa.

The UN says this threat must be addressed immediately if Africa - already struggling under the burden of HIV/Aids, tuberculosis and malaria - is to avoid the serious health damage caused by drug abuse.

The report also shows that the overall market for illicit drugs remained relatively stable in 2005-2006.

For full report (From UN: Office of Drugs and Crime), click here

Pakistan's Political Future and U.S. Interests

Pakistan's Political Future and U.S. Interests
by Lisa Curtis; June 25, 2007 | Heritage Foundation

Following three months of protests against Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf over the government's dismissal of the Supreme Court Chief Justice, U.S. officials have begun to worry about the stability of the Musharraf regime. The most visible example of this growing concern was seen in mid-June when a trio of top U.S. officials visited Pakistan to pulse the situation.

As the Administration evaluates options and determines next steps in its policy toward Islamabad, it should be guided by the strategic necessity of a return to democracy in the country.

When the crisis in Pakistan first began, conventional wisdom in Washington held that Musharraf was likely to weather it and therefore Washington could maintain a narrow policy of strong support for him. However, US officials began to revisit these calculations as the volume of the protests increased and especially when Musharraf attempted to muzzle the media through new governmental powers to rescind television broadcasters' licenses and seize stations that violated government regulations. The efforts to institute the draconian measures were both signs of Musharraf's political vulnerability and determination to retain power.

The case for democracy

There is genuine debate about whether democracy in Pakistan will weaken or strengthen the stability of the Pakistani state. Those supportive of Musharraf note that during Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif's stints in power, violence in Karachi spiralled, sectarian tensions spread and the economy suffered, largely due to rampant corruption that started at the top.

Today's Pakistan has its own set of challenges, including Talibanization of the Northwest Frontier Province, simmering insurgency in Baluchistan, and the recent amassing of hundreds of Islamic extremists in a Mosque in central Islamabad, threatening country-wide suicide attacks unless Islamic laws are adopted in the country. It is true that Pakistan's economy is better off than it was ten years ago, thanks both to sound economic policies by the Musharraf regime and US assistance. But ethnic, sectarian, and religious extremist challenges continue to plague the country.

Those supportive of a return to democracy argue that restoration of civilian rule will broaden the popular support base for countering extremism and terrorism and energize civil society around parties that support secular democracy. This should be a compelling argument for the Bush Administration, which acknowledges the importance of promoting a worldwide freedom agenda to counter al Qaida's support for the creation of an Islamic Wahhabist Caliphate through the violent overthrow of established regimes.

Also compelling is the argument that a wholesale, unfettered opening of the Pakistani system to democracy, without sufficient buy-in from the Pakistani military, could create political chaos that Islamists would seek to exploit.

US-Pakistan relations after Musharraf

The characteristics of a post-Musharraf regime will largely depend on the way he departs from the political scene. If he sticks to his original plan of getting re-elected by the current five-year-old parliament; retaining his uniform indefinitely; and tampering with the results of the parliamentary elections scheduled for early next year, we are more likely to see him exit abruptly. In this scenario, political parties and civil society would intensify their demonstrations and Musharraf would become politically isolated and have to rely increasingly on repressive state powers to sustain his rule. Senior Army leaders would then have to pressure him to step aside. This would translate into a quick departure amid heightened public anger with both Musharraf and his U.S. supporters, making it easier for an anti-U.S. General or religious leader to rise to power.

If, on the other hand, Musharraf adopts a conciliatory approach toward the political opposition and begins a process to restore civilian rule, power will change hands in a smoother, more predictable fashion.

US policymakers worry that a civilian-led government in Pakistan would be less committed to the fight against terrorism and to continuing Pakistan-India dialogue. These concerns are largely unfounded. Considering that Musharraf's decision to support US counterterrorism efforts was taken to safeguard Pakistan's own supreme national interests, it is probable that had a leader of a mainstream secular party been in power at the time of 9/11, he/she would have made the same decision as Musharraf about abandoning official support to the Taliban and supporting the US-led war in Afghanistan.

In any new political order, the military would retain a major role in decision-making on security matters, meaning that counterterrorism operations would likely proceed without major interruption. The Pakistan military also would want to maintain its strong ties with the U.S. military, due at least in part to the large-scale military and economic assistance programs from the U.S. A civilian-led government with broad support from Pakistani society could even strengthen Pakistan's support for countering terrorism, especially if its mandate included the halt of the Talibanization of society.

There also is little reason to believe that talks with India would suffer under civilian rule. Although Musharraf deserves credit for his commitment to moving dialogue forward in recent years and especially for announcing forward-looking proposals for resolving Kashmir, he is the same leader who, as Chief of the Army eight years ago, undermined Nawaz Sharif's talks with New Delhi by launching the Kargil military operation. The current dialogue process has gained broad support from both the Pakistani and Indian publics and has become institutionalized at various levels.

Future prospects

A return to democracy should include a process that is smooth, peaceful, and transparent to ensure that political change brings progress toward a more prosperous and moderate Pakistan and does not open fissures that can be exploited by anti-state extremists. The US can play a helpful role in the transition to civilian rule by pressing the military to work with main political parties and adhere to previous commitments to restore civilian-led rule within a certain timeframe.

Pakistani leaders have already recommended an All Party Conference to discuss the polling process and bring national reconciliation, which could provide a basis for moving forward. The conference would facilitate an open, transparent process that limits the opportunities for backroom politicking and constitutional manipulation that has characterized Pakistani politics in the past. The Pakistani people have demonstrated that they are willing to stand up for the preservation of their democratic institutions and the U.S. cannot afford to ignore their voices.

Lisa A. Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.A version of this article appeared first in the Pakistani weekly “The Friday Times” on June 22, 2007.

"A False Choice in Pakistan": Foreign Affairs

A False Choice in Pakistan
By Daniel Markey: From Foreign Affairs , July/August 2007

A DANGEROUS BACKLASH

Even before the dust had settled on 9/11, U.S. policymakers were well aware that Pakistan was at the center of the world's worst Islamist terrorist networks. The Bush administration quickly moved to persuade once-sanctioned Islamabad to become an essential partner in the "global war on terror." But today, nearly six years after Secretary of State Colin Powell first announced that Washington and Islamabad stood "at the beginning of a strengthened relationship," the Taliban are still entrenched in the Afghan-Pakistani border region, al Qaeda's top leaders have found a secure hideout in Pakistan, and terrorist attacks within and beyond Pakistan's borders persist with deadly regularity.

Given these failures, it is no surprise that Americans are increasingly frustrated with the slow and uncertain progress in Pakistan. Many, including some members of the U.S. Congress and a number of serious Pakistan watchers, have begun to express fundamental doubts about the U.S. partnership with Islamabad. They question whether President Pervez Musharraf -- a general who took power after a coup in 1999 -- and his military are trustworthy allies willing and able to stand on the frontlines in defense of U.S. security. They allege that recent deals between the Pakistani government and tribal elders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the border with Afghanistan look suspiciously like capitulation to the Taliban, orchestrated by Pakistani intelligence agencies with ties to known extremists. They charge, in short, that Musharraf and his allies in Islamabad have taken billions of dollars in U.S. aid while doing too little to advance -- and, in many ways, much to undermine -- the fight against terrorism.

These critics advocate a new approach to Pakistan. They press for tougher talk from Washington -- including threats of sanctions -- in order to pressure Islamabad into undertaking more aggressive counterterrorism operations. And they argue that the United States should cut off Musharraf and push for a transition to civilian democratic rule. Musharraf's military regime, they suggest, will never be a trustworthy partner capable of effectively fighting militancy and extremist ideologies.

It is true that Pakistan's government needs greater popular legitimacy -- won through the ballot box -- in order to advance both long- and short-term counterterrorism goals. But the critics' prescriptions for how to advance these goals risk throwing the United States, Pakistan, and the war on terrorism off course without offering a better alternative. If members of the Pakistani army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) retain ties to militant groups, including Taliban sympathizers, they do so as a hedge against abandonment by Washington. The past six decades of on-again, off-again bilateral cooperation have undermined Pakistani confidence in long-term U.S. partnership. Washington, accordingly, should resist the appeal of the cathartic but counterproductive approach of confronting Islamabad with more sticks and fewer carrots. Any attempt to crack down on Pakistan will exacerbate distrust, resulting in increased Pakistani support for jihadists; coercive threats will undermine confidence without producing better results.

Nor is democracy a magic bullet. Pakistan's security services will not easily be cowed, sidelined, or circumvented, and the challenges facing democracy in Pakistan go far beyond rigged elections or exiled politicians. Weak civilian institutions and a history of dysfunctional civil-military relations mean that bringing democracy to Pakistan is less a matter of resuscitation than of reinvention.

Still, success in Pakistan's long-term struggle against extremism will eventually demand a thoroughgoing democratic transition in Islamabad, even if that transition is not realistic at the moment. The Bush administration has failed to broaden its partnership with Pakistan much beyond army headquarters; it views the civilian dimension of Pakistani politics as a distraction rather than an integral part of the counterterrorism effort. Most Pakistanis believe that Washington is all too happy to work with a pliant army puppet.

Islamabad needs greater popular legitimacy in order to muster grass-roots support for the counterterrorism agenda. The United States should work to empower Pakistan's moderate civilians even as it builds trust with Pakistan's security forces. These goals are not contradictory: Washington can win the confidence of Pakistan's military establishment without accepting its exclusive political authority, and it can help empower civilian leadership without jeopardizing the army's core interests.

Pakistan's upcoming national elections, likely to be conducted in the fall of 2007, open the way for a fresh political configuration in Islamabad. To capitalize on this opportunity, the Bush administration will need to carry off a tough balancing act. On the one hand, Washington must lend vocal support to Pakistan's democratic process, resisting those who wrongly warn that elections will usher in a Hamas-style victory for extremists. Only blatantly rigged elections would be likely to boost the Islamists' share of the vote above the historic highs achieved in 2002. Free and fair elections would favor mainstream parties, enabling a negotiated alliance between the army and a new, more progressive government.

On the other hand, Washington must resist the facile notion that Pakistan's military is the main obstacle to counterterrorism efforts. Pakistan's civilian leaders have nearly always had to negotiate a working relationship with the army in which generals retained significant decision-making power. Pakistan's next leader, regardless of party affiliation, will almost certainly have to give in to this reality, too. And even if the army eventually retires from politics, it will remain an essential instrument in Pakistan's fight against terrorism.

BUSH AND THE GENERAL

By the fall of 2001, the influence of Islamist sympathizers in Pakistan's army, intelligence services, and government had reached a dangerously high level. Pakistan's support for jihadists in Kashmir and Afghanistan, the Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan's nuclear black market, the steady growth of extremist mosques and madrasahs -- all were distressing signs that the country risked slipping into state failure or Islamist rule.

After 9/11, Musharraf made a momentous decision to join the war on terrorism. But this did not mean an immediate U-turn on all support to militant groups in Pakistan. As the White House correctly recognized, even if Musharraf was personally committed to this decision, he faced hard-line skeptics within his own army. The skeptics doubted the United States' staying power, lamented the costs of turning against longtime jihadi associates, and questioned the wisdom of picking fights with global terrorist outfits. Accordingly, Musharraf needed to calibrate his actions in order to avoid alienating a powerful and all-important constituency. And he needed U.S. assistance to bolster his political allies and win over the remaining fence sitters.

In order to build trust with the Musharraf regime, the Bush administration launched a robust engagement strategy, with total assistance to Pakistan estimated at more than $10 billion since 9/11. (Counting covert assistance, the overall figure could be far higher.) The vast majority of this assistance has gone to Pakistan's military. Washington has also worked through international financial institutions to ease Pakistan's debt burden, opening the door for economic growth of just under six percent for the past four years. And in June 2006, the Pentagon notified Congress of plans to sell up to 36 F-16 jets and associated high-tech weapons systems to Pakistan, a major reversal of U.S. policy dating from 1990, when such transactions fell victim to sanctions over Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. On the diplomatic side, meanwhile, top members of President George W. Bush's national security team have turned Pakistan into a regular destination, and the president himself made an unprecedented overnight stop in Islamabad last year. In 2005, the administration named Pakistan a "major non-NATO ally."

Washington's post-9/11 engagement with Islamabad has achieved notable successes. A number of al Qaeda leaders have been killed or captured in Pakistan, including Abu Zubaydah (2002), Ramzi bin al-Shibh (2002), Khalid Sheik Mohammad (2003), Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan (2004), and Abu Faraj al-Libbi (2005). Such achievements would not have been possible without extensive cooperation between Pakistani and U.S. intelligence agencies; they also netted extensive information on al Qaeda's tactics and future plans. The strategy of engagement has also paid dividends on Pakistan's eastern border with India. Following the almost nuclear "Twin Peaks" crisis of 2001-2, Washington's friendly ties with India and Pakistan and steady support for Indo-Pakistani rapprochement have helped ease the way toward dialogue, a cease-fire, and confidence building between the two countries.

But such successes must be qualified by the fact that the Taliban are still present in southern Afghanistan and in Pakistani's FATA and Baluchistan region and that Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri apparently remain ensconced in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. Compounding these problems, Washington has focused too narrowly on Musharraf and his army as the United States' sole partners in Pakistan. So far, the administration has avoided the worst of nightmare scenarios in Pakistan -- state collapse or an Islamist takeover -- but failed to achieve its first-order goals in the war on terrorism or to bolster civilian governance.

Over the past year especially, a growing number of observers have begun to question whether Pakistan is "doing enough" on its side of the border to assist U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Afghans have long blamed Pakistan for providing sanctuary to Taliban fighters. Now, NATO and U.S. commanders in Afghanistan are saying the same thing. Indeed, by the start of 2007, prevailing U.S. opinion (at least outside of the administration) had settled on the idea that Islamabad needed to do more to crack down on militants. Congressional Democrats, frustrated with Pakistan's seemingly weak commitment to the war on terrorism, have proposed that U.S. military assistance be conditioned on demonstrable progress not only on counterterrorism but also on democratic reforms. Some of these critics have charged that Musharraf's army and intelligence services, given their long-standing ties to Islamist parties and jihadi groups, were never serious about fighting terrorism in the first place.

THE MULLAH-MILITARY CONDOMINIUM

It is true that Islamists in Pakistan and Afghanistan have long enjoyed close ties with the Pakistani military. As former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto pointed out in a recent Washington Post op-ed, "Pakistan's military and intelligence services have, for decades, used religious parties for recruits." In the 1971 conflict between the central government and what was then East Pakistan, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan called on Islamist groups to help put down East Pakistan's nationalists. And in the mid-1980s, the mullah-military condominium reached new heights under the rule of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, as massive military assistance to Afghanistan's anti-Soviet mujahideen flowed from the United States and Saudi Arabia through Pakistan's ISI. Pakistan pursued a similar model in Kashmir, funding and training "freedom fighters" for operations against Indian targets. As a general in the field, Musharraf was an enthusiastic supporter of this working arrangement as a means to wrest Kashmir away from New Delhi, and there is little doubt that certain ISI-jihadi connections remained firmly intact after his 1999 coup.

For a while after 9/11, by most accounts, the crackdown by Musharraf's government along the Afghan border differentiated between the Taliban (who are mostly ethnic Pashtuns) and foreign militants (Arabs and Central Asians). The Taliban often got a pass because some members of the military still viewed them as potentially valuable assets for projecting Pakistani influence into Afghanistan and because their long history of a close working relationship made it hard to cut ties overnight.

But over the past two years, particularly as the Pakistani army's heavyhanded occupation of the FATA began to alienate local Pashtun tribes, shifting alliances between the government and domestic militants have made the battle lines more ambiguous. A series of assassinations of moderate tribal elders and signs of creeping "Talibanization" in the settled areas neighboring the FATA raised fears in Islamabad that the militant tide had risen too far. In response, last spring Musharraf shifted to a new policy in the FATA, drawing on a counterinsurgency model by incorporating generous development assistance, political overtures, and a redeployment of the army away from population centers.

On the Afghan side of the border, intensified military operations in the spring and summer of 2006 convinced U.S. and NATO troops that a considerable number of militants had been able to find sanctuary in Pakistan, that prominent Afghan Taliban leaders were managing to plan operations from Pakistan, and that Pakistani border units lacked the will or the capacity to cut off cross-border infiltration. Under these conditions, it is unsurprising that Islamabad's announcement of a new, comprehensive approach to the FATA was greeted with some skepticism in Washington.

In the weeks after the new approach was made official, U.S. and international security force officials reportedly claimed that cross-border attacks were up by 300 percent. Even if these reports were accurate, an initial spike in infiltration should not have been viewed as proof of Pakistan's duplicity or of flaws in its long-term strategy. The infiltration spike was, at least in part, an opportunistic move by militants, capitalizing on the turmoil associated with the army's redeployment out of population centers.

The supposedly enduring quality of the ties between Islamists and the Pakistani army leads Musharraf's critics to two recommendations for U.S. policymakers. First, they argue that Washington should get over its squeamishness about pushing Musharraf and the army to do more in the war on terrorism. They portray Musharraf as a master of doing the least necessary in order to satisfy competing tactical requirements, prioritizing U.S. interests only when the costs of doing otherwise become unacceptably high, as was the case immediately after 9/11. Only an uncompromising stand from Washington, the thinking goes, will scare the Pakistani army straight; the Bush strategy of offering more carrots than sticks should be reversed.

Second, they argue that Washington must sponsor a democratic transition in Pakistan if it wants real progress in fighting terrorism. The Pakistani army has shown itself willing to partner with Islamists in order to dominate domestic politics and project regional influence, whereas Pakistan's progressive parties, especially Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), are said to be self-interested and ideologically committed in their opposition to Islamist militancy. Only a popular mobilization of Pakistan's moderates, the argument goes, can really address the social and developmental deficiencies that ultimately cause extremism.

MISDIAGNOSING THE MILITARY

As convincing as these prescriptions might sound, following them would in fact be counterproductive. Neither coercive threats nor unfettered democracy is likely to yield near-term or sustainable success in the war on terrorism. At the heart of the critics' assessment of Pakistan lies an incorrect assumption about the nature of the army's connection to Islamists. The critics believe that that connection will be impossible, or at least exceedingly difficult, to sever. In fact, a break could come more easily than they think (although, given the long history, it may not happen as quickly or as smoothly as Washington would like). Pakistan's security services maintain these connections less out of ideological sympathy and more out of strategic calculation: as a hedge against abandonment by other allies -- especially the United States.

Fortunately, there are indications that the army would be amenable to a strategic shift. It currently faces very different circumstances than at any other stage in its alliance with the Islamists. During the Cold War, and even until 9/11, the United States tolerated, applauded, or overlooked Pakistan's association with jihadi groups. In regard to Kashmir, Washington was as likely to criticize India for the heavyhandedness of its security forces as to condemn Pakistan's training and financing of "freedom fighters." In Afghanistan, the United States and Pakistan were partners in supporting the mujahideen's anti-Soviet struggle. And in the 1990s, nuclear proliferation concerns distracted Washington's attention from the counterterrorism agenda.

But after 9/11, the diplomatic costs of Pakistan's jihadi strategy started to mount. Overnight, terrorism became the White House's top priority, and Islamabad's semantic distinction between "freedom fighters" and terrorists no longer held water. Overt official ties with Afghanistan's Taliban were the first casualty of the new "with us or against us" era. Soon afterward, the 2001-2 standoff with India forced Musharraf to drop full sponsorship of militants crossing Kashmir's Line of Control. In both instances, Pakistan's ties to Islamists were perceived as having brought on existential threats from outside powers.

The costs of the relationship have gone up in other ways, too. Because of his public commitment to counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, Musharraf is now a marked man, having narrowly survived several jihadi-sponsored attempts on his life. More broadly, the Pakistani army has suffered hundreds of casualties during operations in the FATA, creating new animosities between the security forces and extremists.

Some positive developments have also made the army more amenable to a strategic shift. Pakistan's relations with India have improved since Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's "hand of friendship" speech in the spring of 2003. The prospect of Indo-Pakistani normalization offers tangible economic and political incentives for putting an end to the militancy over Kashmir. On Pakistan's other flank, if the United States and NATO demonstrate convincingly their commitment to building Afghanistan's nascent democratic institutions, supporting President Hamid Karzai's Pashtun-led government and remaining in the country for the foreseeable future, the Pakistani army will have an ever greater incentive to invest in Afghanistan's stability rather than hedge against collapse or the rise of a threatening neighbor.

For all these reasons, a change in the strategic mindset of Pakistan's military is now possible. Washington's policy challenge lies in promoting and accelerating that change, weaning the army away from the Islamists, and cultivating an enduring partnership. Issuing threats -- including to cut U.S. military assistance, end sales of major defense systems (such as F-16s), or curtail prestigious officer-training exchanges -- is precisely the wrong approach. These threats weaken the United States' friends and potential allies. They also arm skeptics in Pakistan's military establishment who believe Washington will again abandon Pakistan once its tactical utility is gone.

The Pakistani officers most vital to the prosecution of counterterrorism operations are the most vulnerable to a regime of targeted sanctions; sanctions are also likely to fall on undeserving officers, frustrating some who might otherwise be committed partners. Targeted sanctions might make sense when the United States is seeking to remove or weaken a rogue regime, but they are not an effective way of inducing an uncertain partner to do more. Indeed, prior bouts of U.S. disengagement have only weakened Pakistan's moderates and empowered the Islamists. Cuts in U.S. training programs for Pakistani officers during the 1990s, for example, created a generation of officers with no personal connections to their U.S. counterparts and, correspondingly, less trust in or sympathy for the United States.

Rather than acquiescing to tough talk from Washington, Pakistan's leadership would likely place greater emphasis on and investment in hedging strategies designed to manage the costs of a possible U.S. abandonment. By forging even closer ties to Beijing, Riyadh, or others, Islamabad could buffer itself from most threats of external intervention and pursue economic development strategies without Washington's assistance. By threatening to abandon Pakistan, Washington would also confirm the preexisting suspicions of many Pakistanis within and beyond the army: that U.S. interests in Pakistan are short term and cynical. Pakistan has lived without the United States in the past, and it might just be willing to walk that path again. And Washington's coercive leverage is further limited by the fact that both Pakistanis and Americans know that Washington has a lot to lose by cutting off Islamabad.


POWER AND WEAKNESS

Trying to force a rapid democratic transition in Pakistan would prove similarly counterproductive. The problem with betting on democracy in Pakistan is not, as the popular myth has it, that Islamists would win. The specter of an Islamist takeover is often invoked to defend Musharraf's resistance to democratic reform, but in fact, Musharraf's undemocratic rule has obscured the lack of widespread support for Islamist parties. Only ISI manipulation of the 2002 elections permitted the Muttahida Majilis-e-Amal, or MMA -- Pakistan's major Islamist coalition -- to win the votes it needed to become a significant factor in national politics. No Islamist group or political party currently possesses the organizational capacity or popular support necessary to seize power in Islamabad, and in legitimate elections the MMA would likely win only a small percentage of the vote (probably around five percent, the historical norm). A truly free and fair vote would more likely return power to the mainstream civilian parties -- with power being held by some combination of Bhutto's PPP and Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League.

The real problem with pushing for a rapid democratic transition is that genuine civilian democracy in Pakistan is an unrealistic aspiration in the near term. If the United States wants to work with Pakistan, one way or another it will have to work with the army -- Pakistan's strongest government institution and the only one that can possibly deal with immediate threats of violent militancy and terrorism. Almost all of Pakistan's other institutions have either fallen victim to neglect (the primary-education system, for example, has yielded a literacy rate of 30-50 percent -- and still, roughly 40 percent of the education budget goes unused because the bureaucracy is incapable of spending it) or been incorporated into the army's expanding sphere of influence. Even if a civilian regime gained power in Islamabad, it would make critical decisions only after considering the army's interests and depend on the army to get things done -- and so, by extension, would Washington.

Pakistan's postindependence history makes clear that even during periods of civilian rule, the army has usually called the shots. Throughout the 1990s, a period of nominal democracy, the army still held sway over critical national security and foreign policy portfolios, including the direction of Pakistan's nuclear program and the management of relations with jihadi outfits in Afghanistan and Kashmir. By most accounts, Bhutto was, for example, largely in the dark about the development of Pakistan's nuclear program until informed by U.S. officials. A decade of wrangling between civilian politicians and the army fueled instability and demonstrated that elections and constitutional provisions are inadequate guarantors of genuine civilian democracy in the face of a concerted military challenge.

The army has only become more deeply entangled in Pakistan's politics and economy under Musharraf, making it even harder to circumvent or sideline. Nearly every public institution of any significance is run by a retired army officer, the army and its assorted foundations supplement their budgets through extensive business and real estate ventures, and the army maintains a vast network of schools, homes, and services for the benefit of soldiers and their families.

Dislodging the army from the driver's seat in Islamabad would therefore require a civilian leader who was either extremely strong or sensitive to the army's institutional interests. By either measure, Pakistan's most prominent party leaders -- Bhutto and Sharif -- would be likely to fail. Both have been weakened by extended exiles and yet still generate a deep level of mistrust within the army. Neither can return to Islamabad without negotiating terms with Musharraf, and it is hard to imagine those terms would include stripping the army chief of his authority. Like it or not, Musharraf -- or a successor general -- will retain the lion's share of power in the near term, even if national elections install a new government in Islamabad this fall.

WASHINGTON'S BALANCING ACT

The task for U.S. policymakers is twofold: firm up Pakistan's counterterrorism commitment, particularly within the army and the ISI, and help bolster Islamabad's ability to mobilize resources, people, and institutions in a broader fight against extremism and militancy. Washington can and should do more on both fronts -- but it must avoid steps that jeopardize efforts to build trust with the Pakistani army.

U.S. policymakers can influence Pakistan's intentions by following three basic rules that will help Washington demonstrate that it is offering Pakistan a genuine, long-term partnership and that the time for hedging bets with Islamists is over. First, do not issue public rebukes: they are counterproductive. Sanctions, real or threatened, only convince Pakistanis that the United States plans to abandon Pakistan the moment bin Laden is dead and Afghanistan is pacified. Further delaying F-16 jet sales would strike a particularly painful chord, reminding Pakistanis of Washington's 1990 sanctions. Even privately issued threats of disengagement or highly targeted sanctions are detrimental. They undermine the chances that members of Pakistan's security establishment will trust Washington over the long run and work harder on specific counterterrorism operations in the short run.

Second, the United States should demonstrate the tangible benefits of a bilateral partnership. Washington should fund a new multiyear assistance package that would pick up after President Bush's five-year, $3 billion program expires in 2009. The "reimbursement" of the army's counterterrorism expenses in the form of U.S. "coalition support funds," which now runs over $1 billion per year, should also continue despite the weak monitoring mechanisms currently in place. The promise of sustained assistance empowers pro-U.S. army officers and weakens skeptics.

In addition to providing money and materiel, the United States should demonstrate its ability to address Pakistan's regional interests. Washington's influence in Kabul and New Delhi can help to ease Pakistani fears of strategic encirclement by a hostile India and its allies -- a core Pakistani security concern. A long-term, robust U.S. commitment to promoting stability in Afghanistan is essential; it offers Pakistan the only way to extricate itself from Afghanistan without ceding the ground to regional adversaries, real or perceived. Washington also can and should continue to exert a moderating influence on stormy Afghan-Pakistani relations. Sustained three-way diplomacy at senior levels -- such as the Bush-Musharraf-Karzai dinner of September 2006 -- should be complemented by enhanced working-level political dialogues.

Nothing could transform Pakistan's long-term potential for stability, wealth, and democratic rule more than normalization of its relations with India. Washington's relationship with New Delhi is closer today than at any other time since India's independence, and the prospects for Indo-Pakistani rapprochement are brighter than they have been in years. Removing barriers to the movement of goods and services across the Indo-Pakistani border could link Pakistan's economy into India's massive growth engine and enhance the potential for significant South Asian-Central Asian energy trade. It would also open educational and cultural opportunities to Pakistan's growing population, of which 85 million are now estimated to be under the age of 19. To the extent that the Bush administration can quietly impress on India the benefits of progress in the Indo-Pakistani "composite dialogue," it should do so. New Delhi is aware of the stakes, since India would suffer more than any other state from Pakistan's instability. But Washington can sweeten the pot with political and economic incentives to promote compromise solutions -- bearing in mind that no conceivable U.S. inducement will ever, on its own, generate a resolution over Kashmir.

Third, if and when greater coercion is deemed necessary, it should be applied through demands for more engagement. Rather than threatening to cut off assistance, the White House should insist on greater access -- to Pakistani intelligence operatives, to army and other security forces, to information. Washington should put an end to any lingering doubts about its plans to stay actively involved in Pakistan and the region. Islamabad is deeply averse to having U.S. armed forces operate autonomously within Pakistan, so these demands should not be raised publicly, and an effort should be made to find less conspicuous ways to integrate Americans into Pakistani operations. Today's communications, reconnaissance, and long-range strike technologies can bring U.S. forces into a fight without ever placing boots on the ground. Beyond possible tactical benefits, greater U.S. involvement would send the signal that Washington plans to invest in long-standing, working-level ties and that its ultimate goal is deeper, closer cooperation.

On the military side, Washington can do much more to improve the effectiveness of Pakistan's security and intelligence services. Additional training, resources, and equipment are still needed to transform elements of the Pakistani army from a heavy counter-Indian force into a more agile counterterrorism, counterinsurgency force. Improving Pakistan's civilian institutional capacity is at least as urgent -- and yet far more difficult. The strength of Pakistan's infrastructure and public health, education, law enforcement, and justice sectors will determine its ability to sustain the fight against extremism over the long term. A weak Pakistani state and a faltering economy prop the door open to discontent, alienation, and radicalization.

Unfortunately, the United States is poorly equipped when it comes to cultivating public opinion or building institutions of civilian governance, especially in countries, such as Pakistan, where U.S. officials and contractors face paralyzing security threats. U.S. assistance dollars spent on public-administration training programs, exchanges, and technical assistance are not wasted, but the scale and scope of Pakistan's challenge require far greater resources. Only millions of Pakistani citizens acting locally and nationally can possibly create and strengthen the institutions responsible for delivering basic services and security.


ARMING PAKISTAN'S DEMOCRACY

Musharraf's military-backed government has failed to build a genuine party organization capable of mobilizing grass-roots activism. The ruling Pakistan Muslim League is cobbled together mainly from opportunists and technocrats, and few observers believe it would win a ruling majority in free and fair elections. Despite its steadily eroding base, Bhutto's PPP remains the only nationwide mainstream party with the potential to energize popular support in the fight against extremism.

In anticipation of national elections this fall, rumors have emerged that a Musharraf-Bhutto deal is in the making. The integration of a wider swath of progressives into Islamabad's ruling coalition would represent a significant step forward, even if the army -- and Musharraf himself -- were to retain a dominant influence over defense and foreign policy. Realistically speaking, forming a PPP-Musharraf coalition might be the best possible way to expand the capacity of antiextremist civilian forces in Pakistan and begin a gradual transition to democratic rule. In time, and under the right conditions, the army might be able to be more fully extricated from domestic politics.

For these reasons -- and contrary to the claims of the most zealous advocates of democracy promotion -- the United States would not benefit from taking a hard line against Musharraf's continuance in office as president or army chief this year. Washington's choice is not between Musharraf and democracy, nor is it between Musharraf and radical militants. Rather, the choice is between an army chief (Musharraf or a successor) in a coalition with progressives and moderates and an army chief in league with other less appealing partners.

Washington's rhetoric and quiet cajoling will not ultimately determine political outcomes, but they can send signals and create opportunities that might not otherwise exist. In addition to providing their good offices for efforts at constructive political mediation, top U.S. officials should stand behind three basic principles when discussing Pakistan. First, they must continue to repeat the mantra of "free and fair" Pakistani elections. Washington should continue to provide technical assistance to Pakistan's Election Commission, warn specifically against the "pre-cooking" of elections by the ISI or other government agencies, and join other international partners in arranging extensive election monitoring by outside observers. Without external pressure, hard-liners around Musharraf will be sorely tempted to rig the elections, as they did in 2002 and 2005, particularly if his party's prospects look bleak. U.S. attention would make it more likely that Musharraf will go for, and abide by, a deal with the PPP in order to form a unity government with a moderate electoral base. But Washington should not press for Musharraf's ouster, since this year's elections are only the first step along the way to disengaging the military from domestic politics. In the near term, Musharraf would simply be replaced by another army chief, perhaps one less well disposed to an agenda of, in his words, "enlightened moderation" or working with moderate political parties.

Second, Washington should take a principled stand on the protection of human rights and the constitutional rule of law. Aside from their intrinsic importance, these issues tend to unite progressive political forces within Pakistan, setting the stage for coalition building. And Washington's words, or lack thereof, are noticed in Islamabad. By speaking firmly on human rights issues -- voicing either encouragement or concern, as necessary -- Washington can lend its indirect support to a new political alliance that would be well positioned to wage the long-term fight against extremism in Pakistan. Unfortunately, Washington's silence immediately after Musharraf suspended Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry this spring did just the opposite: it contributed to a breakdown in unity among progressives and strengthened the hand of hard-liners bent on extracting maximum political advantage. The subsequent street protests have demonstrated how such issues can produce serious unintended political outcomes.

Third, U.S. officials should begin to stress publicly the need for "internal party democracy." One of the traditional weaknesses of Pakistan's political parties is their close association with single individuals or families. Democratic mechanisms within the parties would help turn them into institutions that outlast specific leaders and represent broader interests and ideals. The process of selecting new standard-bearers also energizes party members and expands the base. Deservedly or not, Bhutto and Sharif have become polarizing figures in Pakistani politics. By stressing internal party democracy, Washington could make a principled case for a changing of the guard in Pakistan's mainstream parties and lend its support to the forging of a coalition government with fresh faces at the helm.

SHIFTING GEARS, NOT REVERSING COURSE

Washington should shift gears in its approach to Pakistan, but it should not reverse course. Given the abysmal state of U.S.-Pakistani relations on the eve of 9/11, the Bush administration's six-year partnership with Musharraf has paid real dividends. Pakistan's macroeconomic outlook and its relationship with India have both improved, creating new prospects for long-term stability and prosperity.

With the Bush administration facing challenges to its "freedom agenda" throughout the Muslim world, the White House may be reluctant to place another wager on democratic elections in a country of such strategic significance. But Pakistan is no Egypt or Palestine. A majority coalition built with mainstream moderates and the army's support is now possible. Pakistan's Islamists pose a very real threat, but not yet at the ballot box. Delaying democratic practice weakens the Pakistani government's capacity to fight extremism in the short run and sows the seeds of more extremism in the long run.

At the same time, Washington must win the trust and confidence of Pakistan's army. This goal can only be achieved through closer working relationships and tangible investments that lock the United States into a long-term commitment to the region.

Fortunately, the choice between supporting Pakistan's army and promoting democracy has always been a false one. Both are necessary. Only by helping to empower civilians and earning the trust of the army at the same time will the United States successfully prosecute the long war against extremism and militancy.

Monday, June 25, 2007

Musharraf Loses Ability to Maneuver: Bloomberg

Musharraf Loses Ability to Maneuver After Pakistani Protests
By Khalid Qayum and Anthony Spaeth
Bloomberg; June 26, 2007

June 26 (Bloomberg) -- Four months of street protests have eroded Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's popular support, threatening his plans to get re-elected while keeping control of the military, the key to his power.

A constitutional amendment allowing the army chief of staff to also hold the presidency expires at the end of this year. The Pakistani leader, whose presidential term through an indirect election ends Nov. 15, is facing U.S. calls for a loosening of one-man rule, as well as the protesters' demands for a full restoration of democracy.

``Musharraf's stars are fading,'' Hassan Abbas, a fellow at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, said in an e- mail. ``There is a cry for free, fair and transparent elections.''

The pressure, which comes from Pakistan's middle class, opposition politicians and hard-line Islamists, undermines the position of one of the Bush administration's top allies in the war on terror -- and the man who controls Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

While Musharraf, 63, may decide to work with one of the country's political parties to regain the popular support he had when he seized power in 1999, he has yet to do so. Meanwhile, ``the U.S. is repeating the same mistake it did in Iran,'' said Ahsan Iqbal, information secretary for the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, one of the country's two most popular parties.

American Support

``The people are seeing American support for Musharraf and they are asking why America's demand for democracy stops at the Afghanistan border,'' he said in an interview.

Musharraf so far seems to retain control of the military, and the protests against him haven't swelled into a full-blown movement. Still, the events of the past four months are a rapid turnabout for Musharraf, whose coup came after 11 years of short- lived democratic governments run by Benazir Bhutto and Mohammad Nawaz Sharif.

His troubles began in March when his government removed Supreme Court Chief Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry from his post on unspecified charges. Chaudhry had been likely to rule on the constitutional amendment and legality of Musharraf remaining as army chief while president, the Dawn newspaper reported.

Protesting Lawyers

Lawyers protested in Pakistan's main cities against what they called an assault on the independence of the judiciary. Since then, protests have turned violent -- 40 were killed in clashes between pro- and anti-Musharraf demonstrators in Karachi on May 12 and 13 -- and started to attract broader support.

``The movement is led and organized by the middle class but the support base of this movement, the people on the streets chanting for the chief justice, are from lower strata of society,'' said the Kennedy School's Abbas. ``And this, according to political theory, is an ideal combination for revolutions and major protests.''

Washington sent two envoys to Islamabad this month, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher and Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte. Both urged him to allow more participation in the political process.

Musharraf held a restricted general election in 2002, and was indirectly elected president by the legislature and state assemblies in 2004. The elections weren't considered free because of the absences of Sharif and Bhutto, leaders of the two parties that have dominated Pakistani politics for decades and still have mass support. Musharraf sent Sharif, 57, into exile in 2000. Bhutto, 54, was already living in London and Dubai to avoid corruption cases.

Extending the Amendment

Musharraf has said he wanted the legislature elected in 2002 to re-elect him as president this year and not to wait for a new legislature to be elected in January. His plans on how to extend the constitutional amendment weren't clear.

Anger among Islamist fundamentalists over Musharraf's close ties to the administration of President George W. Bush is also growing, said Abdul Rashid Ghazi, a cleric at the Red Mosque, the oldest in Islamabad. ``The minds of the people of Pakistan, their hatred for Musharraf and, frankly, their hatred of Americans, has now increased,'' he said.

After the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the U.S., Musharraf won the Bush administration's loyalty by abandoning his support for the Taliban in Afghanistan and saying he would crack down on Muslim extremists in Pakistan.

`A U-turn'

``After 9/11 there was a U-turn, a big change, and that change was taken without the consent, the willingness of the people of Pakistan,'' Ghazi said. ``Our own land was used to kill thousands of our own brothers and sisters in Afghanistan.''

Ghazi, whose brother Maulana Mohammad Abdul Aziz is the mosque's chief cleric, said they are leading a ``movement'' or ``jihad'' to rid Pakistan of its politicians, its courts and most of its civil institutions -- although not the military --and replace them with a purely Islamic system.

Last month, students from the mosque seized two police officers and held them in the mosque for four days. Last weekend, they kidnapped seven Chinese workers from an Islamabad acupuncture clinic, which they claimed was a brothel, and held them overnight.

``We are not saying `Musharraf, go away,' and then another Musharraf will rise,'' Ghazi said in an interview at the mosque. ``We say the system is a total failure in Pakistan. It may be accommodating the ruling class, but it's giving nothing to the people.''

To contact the reporters on this story: Khalid Qayum in Islamabad, Pakistan at kqayum@bloomberg.net ; Anthony Spaeth in Islamabad, Pakistan at aspaeth@bloomberg.net