Saturday, September 30, 2006

America's Favorite Dictator



The Musharraf Exception
Commentary by Robert L. Pollock
The Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2006

Pervez Musharraf is America ’s favorite dictator. The Bush administration seems to consider the Pakistani general -- who took power in a 1999 military coup -- an indispensable ally, and has yet to publicly pressure him on the democracy front. Democrats and foreign policy thinkers of the "realist" school seem equally comfortable with the idea of Gen. Musharraf running Pakistan for the indefinite future. Indeed, if the purpose of the general’s new autobiography -- "In the Line of Fire" -- was to win American sympathy ahead of an attempt to fiddle with next year’s presidential election, he probably needn’t have bothered.

A recent meeting of the Musharraf fan club took place at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York , where Gen. Musharraf gave brief remarks and took questions as he launched his book tour on Monday night. He was treated to standing ovations that exceeded mere politeness as he entered and left the hall. Not one questioner raised the democracy issue. And if the moderator -- former Clinton Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin -- was curious, he didn’t let on. He was too busy extolling Gen. Musharraf’s wisdom and the fact that he has been kind enough to employ as prime minister Mr. Rubin’s ex- Citi bank colleague, Shaukat Aziz .

Even among the "neocon" architects of President Bush’s democracy-promotion agenda it’s hard to find an unkind word about Gen. Musharraf, as I discovered while spending several days last year in Islamabad with former Undersecretary of Defense Doug Feith. Behind this bipartisan support -- or at least acceptance -- is Pakistan ’s nuclear arsenal, and the perception that Gen. Musharraf is the only thing standing in the way of its takeover by a radical Islamic government. But there are good reasons to doubt this perception, and to suspect that allowing a permanent "Musharraf Exception" to the democracy agenda will do more harm than good.

On the plus side of the Musharraf ledger is, indeed, the obvious fact that the man with the keys to Pakistan ’s bombs is not a raving Islamic fanatic. He has been an ally -- of convenience, at least -- in the fight against al Qaeda. And his rule, while autocratic, is not oppressive. With a smart and vibrant free press, Pakistan undoubtedly passes what Condoleezza Rice has called the "public square test" -- a fancy way of saying you can speak your mind without fear of being carted away by the cops.

At the same time, however, Gen. Musharraf suffers from his lack of legitimacy among the secular classes who have run Pakistan ’s democratic governments in the past, and who would almost surely win if another free poll is held. The Islamists got only 11% in the last parliamentary election, but the general is increasingly courting them as he attempts to hold power -- which may be one reason his antiterror efforts haven’t included any attempts to crack down on the madrassas. For the same reason, Pakistan ’s efforts to control Taliban elements operating within its borders seem half-hearted. And when confronted with a question about this at the Council Monday night, Gen. Musharraf launched into an ethnocentric diatribe about supporting Afghanistan ’s Pashtun majority. Never mind that Afghan President Hamid Karzai is a Pashtun. Gen. Musharraf went on at length about the apparently unseemly fact that the late anti-Taliban leader Ahmed Shah Massoud -- a "minority" Tajik, he kept pointing out -- is revered in Kabul .

More broadly, Gen. Musharraf used his Council on Foreign Relations remarks to criticize the Bush administration’s broader war on terror. "I feel that we are only using the instrument of the military to combat terrorism," he said, ignoring the democracy agenda. And what does he think the root cause of terrorism is? " Palestine is the core issue," he said, repeatedly. The audience could have been forgiven for thinking it was listening to the tired rhetoric of someone like Hosni Mubarak. But then, Gen. Musharraf seems increasingly like Mr. Mubarak, and less like the modernizer preparing Pakistan for a return to democracy that he claims to be.

Don’t get me wrong. Your humble correspondent is under no illusions about the feasibility of immediate democratic revolutions in every country of the Islamic world. But equally, let’s have no illusions about Pervez Musharraf. He took power illegitimately in a country with some history of democracy, however imperfect. And now he seems to be in no hurry to give it up. The Bush Doctrine can survive the Musharraf Exception over the short run. But over the longer term, the credibility of our efforts to address the root causes of terror will require nudging Pakistan , too, back toward the democratic path.

Mr. Pollock is a member of the Journal’s editorial board.

Amnesty International: Illegal Detensions in Pakistan

Amnesty International accuses Pakistan of illegal detentions for US rewards
The Associated Press
International Herald Tribune: September 29, 2006

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan Human rights watchdog Amnesty International has accused Pakistan's government of illegally detaining innocent people on suspicion of terrorism, secretly imprisoning them and transferring them to U.S. custody for money.

Hundreds of Pakistanis and foreigners have been rounded up on suspicion of links to terrorism since the U.S.-led war on terror started after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, Amnesty International said in a report released Friday in Islamabad.

"The war on terror has added a new layer of human rights violations to the existing patterns of abuses (in Pakistan)," said Angelika Pathak, an Amnesty International researcher who helped prepare the report, titled "Human Rights Ignored in the War on Terror."

"The phenomenon of enforced disappearance was virtually unknown before the war on terror," she said.

The human rights group suggested that the lure of U.S. government rewards had led in many cases to illegal arrests of people, including women and children, in Pakistan.

Pakistan also has its own bounty program that provides money for the capture of suspected terrorists, which the report did not take into consideration.

"Bounty hunters — including police officers and local people — have captured individuals of different nationalities, often apparently at random, and sold them into U.S. custody," said Claudio Cordone, senior director of research at Amnesty International.

Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Tasnim Aslam rejected the allegation that Pakistan illegally detained people in exchange for money.

"Whenever we arrest any foreign terror suspect, we try to send him back to the country he belongs," she told The Associated Press. "In most of the cases, such suspects are not accepted by their own government."

"Naturally, we cannot keep them here," she said.

Amnesty International's allegations, based largely on interviews with one-time detainees, come days after the country's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, said in his memoir that Pakistan had captured 689 al-Qaida terror suspects, and turned over 369 to Washington.

"We have earned bounties totaling millions of dollars," Musharraf wrote in his book, "In the Line of Fire," without specifying how much was paid.

Cordone said in a statement that many people detained in Pakistan ended up in secret locations or at U.S. prisons, including Guantanamo Bay and Bagram, north of the Afghan capital, Kabul.

"Hundreds of people have been picked up in mass arrests, many have been sold to the USA as 'terrorists' simply on the word of their captor, and hundreds have been transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Bagram Air base or secret detention centers run by the USA," he said.

"The road to Guantanamo very literally starts in Pakistan," he said.

For the Amnesty International report
: click here

Musharraf Book: An Indian Perspective

Musharraf: from facts to fantasy
By Praful Bidwai
The News: September 30, 2006

The writer, a former newspaper editor, is a researcher and peace and human-rights activist based in Delhi

If President Pervez Musharraf wanted to make waves globally through his memoir, he has succeeded spectacularly. An exceptionable combination of circumstances favoured him: a press conference with President Bush, former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's denial of his claim that the United States threatened to bomb Pakistan "back to the stone age" if it didn't join the war on terrorism after 9/11; Musharraf's prime-time appearance on a channel that's part of the conglomerate that owns his publishing company; and his Council on Foreign Relations speech.

Yet, even Musharraf's detractors must admit, these were mere 'force multipliers'. The original force that drove the tsunami of publicity for the book came from its controversial content. The book's release was one of the greatest state-financed publicity exercises undertaken anywhere. It will be debated for a long time. It has certainly been hotly debated in India, where some extracts were first published a week ago.

So how does the book appear from across the border to someone committed to democracy, peace and India-Pakistan reconciliation? It's best understood through four themes or rubrics: bragging, mis-assessment, truth-telling, and fantasy.

First, the staggeringly boastful self-promotion. Musharraf clearly sees himself as an infallible leader of extraordinary talent. He presents himself as a victim of circumstances, who nevertheless unfailingly makes the right decisions that will eventually rescue Pakistan from chaos and bring it glory, like in Kargil.

For Musharraf, his Kargil operations "were a landmark in the history of the Pakistani Army" -- not least because only 5,000 Pakistani troops joined combat "in support of the freedom-fighter groups" and compelled India "to employ more than four divisions, with the bulk of the … artillery coming from strike formations" located elsewhere. The Pakistani performance will be "written in golden letters".

Musharraf presents Kargil as a 'defensive manoeuvre' to pre-empt India's 'offensive operations' along the Line of Control -- "conducted flawlessly, a technical marvel of military professionalism…" He claims that "the Indians, by their own admission, suffered over 600 killed and over 1,500 wounded." But "our information suggests" that the numbers are at least twice as high.

The Indian government says Kargil was carefully planned. Pakistani troops crossed the LoC, but sustained big losses: "documents like identity cards, pay books and other identification papers revealed that as many as seven Northern Light Infantry battalions (more than 7,000 troops) were involved. They were supported by auxiliary troops" too. The Indian army "recovered 249 bodies, of which only five were accepted by Pakistan, and the total Pakistani casualties of 725 killed included 45 officers and 68 Special Service Group personnel." The army says it deployed only two mountain divisions and two independent brigade-strength troops to dislodge Pakistani forces from Kargil.

We may never know the truth given the 'fog' of India-Pakistan's prolonged hot-cold war. But Musharraf's account of Kargil isn't the truth. Kargil wasn't a 'victory' by any yardstick. Pakistan was forced to withdraw from the territories it captured.

Musharraf is equally boastful when he explains why he changed his stance on terrorism, the Taliban and Al Qaeda after 9/11: "Armitage's undiplomatic language had nothing to do with my decision." He changed his mind not because he believed in the 'war on terror', but because it was in the 'national interest' and Pakistan's 'self-preservation'. He reached that conclusion after he "war-gamed the US as an adversary." Whatever the merits of this logic, it bears testimony to enormous hubris: you don't war-game America unless you've a gigantic ego.

That hubris is evident in Musharraf's account of the December 2003 attempt on his life: "I immediately realised I was staring terrorism in the face…[as]… the target. But unlike most leaders, I am also a soldier, chief of army staff and supreme commander. I am cut out to be in the midst of battle -- trained, prepared and equipped. Fate and the confluence of events have seen to it that Pakistan and I are in the thick of the fight against terrorism. My training has made me constantly ready" for this.

A second theme of Musharraf's book is mis-assessment of political and strategic realities. An astounding example is the claim that India probably stole uranium enrichment technology from A Q Khan's Dubai-centred global network.

The claim is based on the following: In 1994-95, Khan ordered the manufacture of 200 P-1 centrifuges that had been "discarded by Pakistan in the mid-80s". These were dispatched to Dubai for "onward distribution". "The Dubai-based network had employed several Indians, some of whom have since vanished." So, "there is strong probability that the Indian uranium enrichment programme may also have its roots in the network and could be a copy of the Pakistani centrifuge design."

'Vanishing Indians' don't quite make the claim convincing. More important, India's uranium enrichment efforts and centrifuge designs go back to the early 1980s. It's another matter that that programme hasn't been hugely successful. It would have been had India used Pakistani centrifuge designs, themselves stolen from Europe.

Another example of mis-assessment is Musharraf's view that Nawaz Sharif wantonly agreed to a Kargil ceasefire in July 1999 in Washington. Pakistan held the military advantage. So Clinton could have been persuaded to side with Pakistan. In fact, India had by then taken Tololing and Tiger Hill. Pakistan was widely seen as 'irresponsible' -- the aggressor who crossed the LoC. Kargil brought Pakistan ignominy and highlighted the nuclear danger in the subcontinent.

A third feature of the book is blunt truth-telling. Musharraf admits, contrary to all official protestations, that Pakistan did deploy regular troops in Kargil, and that the CIA paid Islamabad 'millions' for handing over 369 al-Qaeda suspects after 9/11 -- a claim now causing much embarrassment. Musharraf's tone is deadpan while describing his own record of indiscipline as a soldier: "it was shocking indeed. Entries in red ink were overflowing the total allocated space" on his service documents.

Equally frank is his account of the Agra summit. It failed because, as he told Vajpayee, "there seemed to be someone above the two of us who had the power to overrule us" [Advani].

However, the book's fourth theme is its fantasising -- about how Pakistan is destined to fight, and never to condone terrorism, and how the most ruthless and fanatical killers of ordinary civilians in Kashmir are 'freedom-fighters'. Musharraf also deludes himself that he is more authentically 'democratic' than elected civilian leaders -- a favourite fantasy of many despots.

However, the most worrisome fantasy is Musharraf's view, stated most 'emphatically', that "whatever movement has taken place so far in the direction of finding a solution to Kashmir is owed considerably to the Kargil conflict". This takes one's breath away. It's only after India and Pakistan put Kargil's bitter legacy away, and after the terrible 10 month-long eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation of 2002, that their relations thawed and the peace process began.

The danger of such khaki fantasies about the effectiveness of military force should be only too obvious. We have already paid a heavy price for them. Tomorrow, the price could take the form of a mushroom cloud.

One thing is becoming clear. Musharraf's book will ruffle many features and create resentment and suspicion in both Pakistan and India. It is unlikely to contribute to the dialogue process. Indeed, that process will have to go on despite the book.
Email: prafulbidwai1@yahoo.co.in

Friday, September 29, 2006

Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban: An Informed Opinion

Sarah Chayes delivers Charles Francis Adams Lecture: “Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban”
From Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University September 27, 2006

In Afghanistan, the US had no plan after invasion beyond chopping off the hydra’s head and hoping that full democracy would emerge,” Sarah Chayes explained in her lecture at The Fletcher School on Tuesday evening, “Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban.” Illustrating the strong desire for rule of law in the country, she thought back to what an Afghan friend told her several months ago: “‘[In America,]You have such beautiful law.’ This rule of law is what the US had to offer Afghanistan, and the governance we have provided is so short of what Afghans were hoping for,” she explained. Chayes came to The Fletcher School on September 26 to describe her experiences and observations in Afghanistan as a journalist and advocate.

In the fall of 2001, award-winning National Public Radio (NPR) reporter Sarah Chayes arrived in Kandahar, Afghanistan to cover the US-led war against the Taliban. A seasoned correspondent, Chayes had years of experience reporting from conflict and post-conflict areas, but increasingly felt as though, as a journalist, she was, “talking endlessly and making a living off of other people’s stories” - she felt ready to do something more.

In Afghanistan – and in Kandahar especially – she developed a strong attachment to the country, and, just before she was scheduled to leave in 2002, she sat down for a meal with her most important local source, President Karzai’s uncle. He asked her, “Won’t you come back and help us?” She knew she could not refuse.

This invitation began the next stage of Chayes’ work in Afghanistan. She left NPR and to work with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the country, first with President Karzai’s brother at Afghans for Civil Society, where she organized several projects that, in Chayes’ words, typically fall “outside of NGO parameters,” including a local radio station, habitat programs and programs to integrate women into the economy. She has since started her own NGO, Arghand: a locally-staffed natural soap-making cooperative.

Beyond her more formal work, Chayes has spent the past several years in Kandahar developing a strong personal understanding of the politics, history, language and culture of the region and country and observed the major changes that have taken place there since the fall of the Taliban and the arrival of US and NATO troops. It is this understanding that is the focus of Chayes’ new book The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban, and which was the focus of her lecture at Fletcher.

Chayes holds the Afghan government accountable for much of the ongoing instability in the country, but argues strongly that the US be held responsible as well. When the US arrived in Afghanistan in 2001, according to Chayes, perhaps their biggest mistake was the decision to finance, arm and place into power regional warlords – individuals that continue to hold these positions today. As one man told Chayes, It is a return to “the era of robbers” in Afghanistan.

While the US felt they could count on these warlords to “bring order” to the country with a policy of “governance later, security now,” instead it has meant widespread government-sponsored corruption and thuggery. “It is the return to power of the people who initially made Afghan people’s lives insecure.” And it is this insecurity, argues Chayes, that is driving the insurgency in Afghanistan.

Though Afghanistan held elections in 2005 –internationally perceived as a sign of progress – Chayes contends that voting and the counting of ballots was far from “free and fair,” causing increased local disillusionment with the Afghan government.

“We [internationally] tend to confuse the process of democracy with democracy,” Chayes argued. “Afghans know clearly that this is not how democracy is supposed to work.” She went on to discuss how the extreme corruption in politics throughout Afghanistan is generating intense distrust of and is alienating Afghans from their government. The damage to the political system has become so great, Chayes explained, that while government offices have finally begun to recognize the need to hire ethical, dedicated, intelligent public servants, few are willing to accept these jobs for fear of being associated with the government.

Chayes’ own experiences in Kandahar have not been removed from the bureaucracy, corruption and violence that now plague much of the country. During her lecture, she described struggles with the local governor to arrange for electricity to reach local businesses, encounters with corrupt officials (including one incident where she sat cross-legged on a bureaucrat’s desk until he ceased demanding bribes and signed her paperwork) and the assassination last summer of her closest friend, the local Chief of Police.

When asked about her views on Afghanistan’s future, Chayes was not optimistic “The government simply has to step forward and perform its duty,” she concluded: there remains much work to be done.

-- by Liz Mandeville, MALD ‘08

Military officer as a vice chancellor of a university: What is the message?

Dawn: September 29, 2006
Another army man as VC

THE appointment of a retired brigadier as the vice-chancellor of Bolan University by the Balochistan government is contrary to what FAPUASA and the HEC had expected. Barely a week ago, Dr Attaur Rahman, chairman of the Higher Education Commission, had assured a delegation of the Federation of All Pakistan Universities Academic Staff Association that no army person would now be appointed VC in any university. It is shocking that in total disregard of academic requirements, the governor of Balochistan has proceeded to break the rules to accommodate yet another retired military officer as VC. The prescribed procedure is pretty clear and straightforward. It calls for a ‘vice-chancellor search committee’ to be formed with the governor’s approval, followed by an announcement by the HEC for the position of vice-chancellor in all national dailies. The applicants are then short-listed and interviewed by the search committee after which it has to forward the names of three candidates for the chancellor’s (governor of the province) approval. The chancellor will then have the prerogative to select a person from amongst them or ask for fresh recommendations.

Obviously nothing of this sort has been done in this particular case. Thus Balochistan University becomes the third institution of higher education in the country in recent years to have an ex-army officer at the helm. Punjab University, the oldest university in the country with a proud tradition of learning, is headed by Lt Gen Arshad Mahmood who is not a PhD but just an MSc in War Studies and Defence and Strategic Studies (QAU). The Quaid-i-Azam University is also headed by a retired captain of the Pakistan army allegedly with a questionable degree. At this rate, Pakistan which has the dubious honour of having no university of world standing (to quote the HEC chairman) will do serious harm to the few institutions it has. At one time, the Balochistan University was headed by giants such as the venerable Prof Karrar Husain, the founding vice-chancellor. The HEC, headed by an academic, understands the negative implications of such appointments. In the case of Balochistan, a province suffering from the throes of a military crackdown, an army man at the head of its premier institution of learning has serious political implications as well. How will the HEC react?

Thursday, September 28, 2006

South Asia Peace Process: Why its not going forward?

VIEW: Jammu and Kashmir: where is the delay? —Mubashir Hasan
Daily Times, September 29, 2006

My peace seeking friends and I have had several opportunities during the last two years to interact with the people and leaders of Jammu and Kashmir on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC). However, we have not had any interaction with the leadership of the militants who are an important factor in the situation.

It is gratifying to conclude that the present is an auspicious time. The people and the political leadership of Jammu and Kashmir and the governments of Pakistan and India are keen that the issue is resolved without undue delay. No party is dragging its feet in moving towards an agreement.

A large majority of the people of the former state and their leadership seem to agree:

n The territory of the state includes the territories of the Pakistani and Indian Administered Jammu and Kashmir as well as Gilgit and Baltistan.

n The armies of Pakistan and India should stop coming to the aid of civil authorities and defending the LoC but continue to defend the border with China. The withdrawal of military forces from the entire territory of Jammu and Kashmir will therefore be in order except from borders with China.

n Pakistan and India should enter into a treaty that they shall not use the territory of the state to wage or prepare for war or war-by-proxy against each other. For faithful observance of such a treaty, India, Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir may devise a system of monitoring the activity by any party that amounts to a violation of the letter or spirit of the treaty.

n The state of Jammu and Kashmir may make its own arrangements for fighting internal disturbances of law and order — a task now performed by the armies and security forces of Pakistan and India.

n The rights and facilities that may be retained by India and Pakistan to use the network of roads, railways, airports and telecommunications for the purpose of defence against foreign powers may be specified.

n The relations with foreign countries that may be conducted by Pakistan and India involve the questions of war and peace, entering into treaties and agreements on trade commerce, investments, immigration and emigration, visas and passports etc may be specified.

n The reunified state of Jammu and Kashmir may have governments at several levels for example, of provincial nature at Srinagar, Jammu, Laddakh and Muzaffarabad and also a central government at Srinagar.

It may sound strange that at this point in time, the main reason the peace process is not going full steam ahead is that the political leadership of Jammu and Kashmir does not feel free to spell out what they agree to in private. The leaders of political parties and groups know what they want and there are no unbridgeable differences among them.

Similarly there are no big roadblocks from the Indian and Pakistani sides. The government of Pakistan is on record that it will agree with the wishes and aspirations of the people of the former state, as long as these do not amount to independence or division of Jammu and Kashmir. The government of India is equally keen to go to its parliament with a solution, which it can claim meets with the approval of the leadership of the former state. Similarly, the government of India has indicated over the years that barring independence “sky is the limit” for the purpose of settling the Kashmir issue. Further, the relevance of the borders is no longer what it used to be.

The main task before the peace seekers then is to assist the political parties and groups of Jammu and Kashmir in initiating discussions — confidential and otherwise, indirect or direct — amongst one another in order that they might move towards an almost final agreement about the future of their state.

The governments of India and Pakistan must give up their traditional reservations on meetings between people from both sides of the LoC. They should facilitate all activities aimed at promotion of consensus among the leaders of Jammu and Kashmir; indeed, encourage them.

Dr Mubashir Hasan is a former finance minister

Not a banana republic?

Not a banana republic?
Reality check
By Shafqat Mahmood; The News - September 29, 2006

The writer is a former member of parliament and a freelance columnist based in Lahore

A general who takes over the country through a coup and rules by force says we are not a banana republic. This term was used to describe Latin American countries that grew bananas and were ruled by generals. We don't grow enough bananas but generals always seem to be ruling us. What is our category then?

Here are some facts. When a power outage affects large parts of the country, rumours emerge of a coup and expand like a tsunami. No one thinks of the constitution or the courts, no one worries about legality or the rule of law. The news seems so credible that federal ministers call journalists and journalist stand around TV stations waiting for the tanks to arrive.

Our ruling general says that these stories were the product of a sick mind. There must be an awful lot of sick minds in the country because no one questioned the possibility of a coup. There were arguments for and against it and these centred around circumstances and personalities of the people involved. But, no one doubted that it could happen. Colin Powell is quoted by Bob Woodward as saying that he made seven demands of Pakistan and would have been satisfied if three or four had been accepted. Our general agreed to five.

The simple question is that either the policy supporting the Taliban until September 11 was wrong and not in our national interest or it was right and in the best interest of the country. If it was wrong, it should have been changed anyway. If it was right, we should have stuck to our guns, literally, whatever the consequences. From the circumstances narrated by the general in his book, it appears that the policy was right but he was intimidated. He 'war gamed' an onslaught from the US and concluded we couldn't take it.

We are not a banana republic but the decision to facilitate the American attack on Afghanistan was taken by one man. The people had no role in this decision and nor did any of the representative institutions because they simply did not exist. The content of the decision is important but the process is equally important. They only process we had were the mental calculations of one man who concluded that if you can't fight 'em, join 'em.

We are not a banana republic but we have become bounty hunters. The general says in his book that Pakistan was given head money for delivering Al Qaeda suspects to the Americans [he later backtracked on these remarks]. This raises many questions. Was the government of Pakistan hunting terrorists because it was its legal and moral duty to do so or was it being done to make money? If it was not for money, then why was the money received? Americans could have increased our aid if they were happy with us but why receive head money? No wonder an American official had the audacity to suggest some time back that we would sell our mothers to make a few bucks.

There are other questions regarding this bounty hunting deal. Was the money received deposited in government coffers or was it given to individuals including the general himself? If it came into government coffers, there must be a record of it and it had to be reflected in some budgetary head. Was this done? This issue cannot be allowed to rest. We have given nearly four hundred Al Qaeda suspects to the Americans. How much money was received in return and where did it go. This information must be made public and the beneficiaries identified.

We are not a banana republic yet our top nuclear scientist is able to smuggle eighteen tons of nuclear material out of the country without any state agency knowing about it. General Musharraf says that even the army was not aware of what was going on. This is breathtaking because not only was the army guarding our nuclear installations but a C-130 air force plane was used to transport this material. If the general is to be believed, one nuclear scientist not only became bigger than the civilian government, which was not too difficult, but became more powerful than even our defence services. This just beggars belief.

We are not a banana republic but the Supreme Court decided a few days ago that the high courts have no jurisdiction to question the decisions of military courts against servicemen. In democracies, the constitution provides a cover of justice to all citizens whether military or civilian and everyone has a right to approach the superior courts. Yes, the military does have the right to charge and try military offenders and civil organisations have their own systems of punishment. But, any aggrieved person has the right of appeal to superior civilian courts. Recently the supreme court in the US went to the extent of ruling that even non-citizens, and in this case those defined as Al Qaeda terrorists, also have the right to be tried in a normal civil court of law. Not here.

We are not a banana republic but the ruling general said not long ago that women get raped in this country because they want to migrate to Canada. Besides being highly insulting to women and in crass bad taste, it was also a tacit admission that raped women do not get justice here. The Women's Protection Bill was an opportunity for the general and for the fake government he has put in place to make amends. He and his cohorts instead decided to play politics and allowed a handful of mullahs to call the shots. In democracies, majorities decide but over here since fake assemblies mean nothing they are easily ignored or bypassed.

I have so far discussed some current questions but there is so much in our history, that can help us decide whether we are a banana republic or not. Not a single government since independence has been changed in the normal way. Since the death of Quaid-e-Azam and the murder of Liaqat Ali Khan every government in our history has either been kicked out or as in the case of Zia, the incumbent died. Normal transfer of power has just not happened. Among our civilian and elected prime ministers, one was shot, another hanged and two are languishing in exile.

Every election in our history, with the exception of 1970, has either been rigged or its results not accepted. Three of our ruling generals, including Musharraf, conducted rigged referendums to give a fig leaf of legitimacy to their power grab. We have a prime minister who cannot get elected as a local councillor on his own yet he won two national assembly seats.

The list goes on and on and the examples are endless. We can take any area of our national life and determine whether rule of law is the deciding principle or something else. You decide dear reader where we stand.
Email: shafqatmd@gmail.com

Also see:
Musharraf charm offensive belies Pakistan realities
By Paul Eckert, Boston Globe September 28, 2006

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - With sales of his memoir surging, two White House meetings in a week and a witty performance on a hip American comedy show, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf appears to be on a public relations roll.

Experts warn, however, that any boost Musharraf gave Pakistan's troubled image could be short-lived if the key U.S. ally in the war on terrorism cannot curb Islamic militancy and make his mantra of "enlightened moderation" take root at home.

Musharraf flew to London on Thursday after a U.S. media blitz with his three-day-old memoir running fourth on the Amazon.com bestseller list, ahead of Irish rockers U2 and conservative TV host Bill O'Reilly.

The figure Musharraf cut is a far cry from a year ago, when he had a public shouting match in New York with Pakistani rights activists after he told media that some women in his country made rape claims to get money and immigration visas.

The public relations makeover was not lost on editorialists in Pakistan, even those critical of Musharraf's rule and his decision to publish his book, "In The Line of Fire," while in office.

"Though this may be through the eyes of a military man who overthrew an elected government, at least Pakistan is not in the news these days for honor killings or sectarian attacks," wrote The News on Thursday.

"It would be fair to say that General Musharraf has at least won the PR war during his US visit if nothing else," said the daily in an editorial.

CAN HE DELIVER?

But it will take more than charm for Pakistan to allay lingering concerns about its democratic record and allegations that parts of its establishment give support to Islamic extremists at home and in neighboring Afghanistan.

Musharraf was chosen to head Pakistan's army in 1998, and took control of the government a year later after the army launched a bloodless coup. Critics say he has damaged the country's political institutions while shoring up his rule.

U.S. scholar Robert Hathaway described Pakistan's image in the United States as "terrible, for a variety of reasons."

"Nuclear-armed, Muslim majority country run by a military dictator, many of whose people, indeed probably most of whose people, are sympathetic to our enemies," said Hathaway, director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center, referring to the image Americans hold of Pakistan.

Pakistan's image suffers, above all, from the perception it harbors Osama bin Laden, and from concerns such as Musharraf's failure to amend Islamic "Hudood" laws that are harsh on rape victims and a pact with tribal leaders in North Waziristan that critics say may give Taliban Islamic militants a free pass.

Musharraf vigorously disputed his critics, both with clever repartee on the satirical "Daily Show" and forceful and earnest speeches at thinktanks in New York and Washington.

"He's a pretty good performer and that obviously makes an impression," said Teresita Schaffer, a South Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

"But as far as his and Pakistan's image is concerned, what is going to speak most loudly is his actions," she added.

The small community of U.S. experts who follow Pakistan say the actions from Musharraf that will matter most will be progress on his pledge to stop incursions into Afghanistan by Taliban militants who hide in mountainous border regions.

Experts who believe that the plain-spoken Musharraf mostly means what he says with counter-terrorism pledges still doubt whether he can follow through, dependent as he is on the support of Islamist parties who oppose his agenda.

"With the coalition that he has and the kind of support he has, he can't deliver on the frontier or domestically," said Marvin Weinbaum, a senior scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, who just returned from a tour of Pakistan.

British Report : Pakistan Intelligence arm ISI under tough scrutiny

BBC: September 28, 2006
Key quotes from the document
Key quotes from a leaked Ministry of Defence think-tank paper which alleges that Pakistan's intelligence service, the ISI, has indirectly helped the Taleban and al-Qaeda and should be dismantled. The research paper was written by a senior officer at the MoD-run Defence Academy. The Ministry of Defence have responded that the views contained in it do not reflect the views of the MOD or the government.

on THE WAR ON TERROR

The wars in Afghanistan and particularly Iraq have not gone well and are progressing slowly towards an as yet unspecified and uncertain result.

The War in Iraq...has acted as a recruiting sergeant for extremists from across the Muslim world.

The Al Qaeda ideology has taken root within the Muslim world and Muslim populations within western countries. Iraq has served to radicalise an already disillusioned youth and Al Qaeda has given them the will, intent, purpose and ideology to act.

British Armed Forces are effectively held hostage in Iraq - following the failure of the deal being attempted by COS (Chief of Staff) to extricate UK Armed Forces from Iraq on the basis of 'doing Afghanistan' - and we are now fighting (and arguably losing or potentially losing) on two fronts.

The West will not be able to find peaceful exit strategies from Iraq and Afghanistan - creating greater animosity...and a return to violence and radicalisation on their leaving. The enemy it has identified (terrorism) is the wrong target. As an idea it cannot be defeated.


on PAKISTAN

The Army's dual role in combating terrorism and at the same time promoting the MMA and so indirectly supporting the Taliban (through the ISI) is coming under closer and closer international scrutiny.

Pakistan is not currently stable but on the edge of chaos.

[The West has] turned a blind eye towards existing instability and the indirect protection of Al Qaeda and promotion of terrorism.

Indirectly Pakistan (through the ISI) has been supporting terrorism and extremism - whether in London on 7/7 or in Afghanistan or Iraq.

The US/UK cannot begin to turn the tide until they identify the real enemies from attacking ideas tactically - and seek to put in place a more just vision. This will require Pakistan to move away from Army rule and for the ISI to be dismantled and more significantly something to be put in its place.

Musharraf knows that time is running out for him...at some point the US is likely to withdraw funding (and possibly even protection) of him - estimated at $70-80M a month.

Without US funding his position will become increasingly tenuous.

The many faces of faith




The many faces of faith
WITH MALICE TOWARDS ONE AND ALL... Khushwant Singh
Hindustan times; September 2, 2006

If there was a public opinion poll conducted in the subcontinent (comprising Pakistan, India and Bangladesh) on who is the most deserving person for a Nobel Peace Prize, I have no doubt that Asma Jehangir of Lahore would emerge as the outright winner. And for good reasons. She is a Muslim living in a mullah-military-male-dominated country in a stifling atmosphere of suspicion and where hatred of India thrives; where Draconian laws are used to stamp out heresy and punish blasphemy with death. She has been speaking out against all these for many years; attempts have been even made to silence her.

Pakistan, India and Bangladesh face similar problems; the upsurge of religious fanaticism (kattarpan) which often turns to violence against people of other faiths. Pakistan and Bangladesh are Islamic states on either side of India, ostensibly secular and largely Hindu. If the Pakistanis had their way, they would put the likes of Asma Jehangir in a burqa. But she refuses to wear one, leads demonstrations against repressive measures. Takes up cases of men and women persecuted by the government. She is often condemned for being an Indian agent.

Bangladesh is going the Pakistan way. Take a look at Hiranmay Karlekar’s Bangladesh: The Next Afghanistan (Sage). You will understand how serious religious bigotry has become. It has not thrown up a leader to fight it; woman like Taslima Nasreen who has a fatwa of death had to flee to Europe and is currently seeking asylum in India. I hope our government will extend her a visa.

Both Pakistan and Bangladesh find it convenient to let extremist elements turn to India for their ill-conceived jehads (holy wars) and get the martyrdom they seek. In its turn Hindu bigots preach hate against Muslim bigotry; both thrive on mutual hatred.

Our secular roots nurtured by Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Nehru, Badruddin Tyabji, Netaji Subhas Bose, Maulana Azad and others are being destroyed by Hindu fundoos. They also preach hatred against Pakistan and Bangladesh. However, we do have a free press and quite a few willing to fight them. Efforts have borne fruit. The forces of religious fundamentalism are in retreat.

Religions were a powerful force when they were established. Gradually they became forces of backwardness and divisiveness because of preaching superiority over other religions. We are witnessing this phenomenon in all the three countries.

In many ways Asma Jehangir’s life has been like that of Aung San Su Kyi of Burma who has been under home arrest for many years. She was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace some years ago. Asma has been roughed up by the police, put under house-arrest and jailed. She had to send her children abroad for safety but continues to raise her voice against oppression and injustice. Can you think of anyone more deserving than her?

To read Asma Jahangir's profile, click here, and here

Hot Topic: The Jihad and the West



The Jihad and the West – Part I
Jihad is ultimately political action that can be influenced by dialogue and negotiations

Riaz Hassan
YaleGlobal, 21 September 2006

White House blessings for Jihadis: President Ronald Reagan received Afghan Mujahideen fighters in the Oval Office in February 1983. Enlarged image

ADELAIDE: The need for a dialogue between Islam and the West has never been more acute than now, but Pope Benedict XVI’s recent description of Islam as “evil and inhuman” is clearly not the best approach. In his lecture on “Faith and Reason” at Regensburg University, the pope quoted the 14th century Byzantine Christian emperor Manuel II Palaeologus as saying, “Show me just what Mohammad brought was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by sword the faith he preached.” Notwithstanding the Vatican’s statement that the pope meant no offense and, in fact, desired dialogue, in the eye of many Muslims his remarks only reinforced a false and biased view of Islam – not conducive to dialogue.

In his lecture the pope made several references to Islamic theology on the nature of God, reason and faith, but his passing reference to jihad presents the stereotypical Western view of the concept, which totally ignores extensive Islamic debates on the topic. The word “jihad” appears in more than 40 verses of the Koran with varying connotations. No single “reading” of the verses can claim primacy. It is surprising that a theologian of the pontiff’s stature sees jihad as an Islamic holy war in the Christian tradition. In Islamic theology, war is never holy: It is either justified or not, and if it is justified, then those who are killed are regarded as martyrs.


The meanings of “jihad” in Islamic history have been profoundly influenced by the prevailing social, political and material conditions. “Jihad,” in other words, is not a fixed category of Islamic thought, but has a complex and contested history that refracts changing understandings about the scope and meaning of worldly action. The meanings of “jihad” in Islamic jurisprudence have included, first, personal striving for achieving superior piety; second, justifications for early Arab conquests of non-Muslim land; third, struggle for Islamic authenticity; fourth, resistance against colonialism; and finally, now, the struggle against the perpetrators of, what sections of Islamists have labeled, “Muslim holocaust.”

For contemporary Islamists, jihad is neither simply a blind and bloody-minded scrabble for temporal power nor solely a door from which to pass from this life into the hereafter. It is, in fact, a political action in which the pursuit of immortality and martyrdom is inextricably linked to a profound endeavour in this world to establishing a just community on earth. It is a form of political action whose pursuit realizes God’s plan on earth and immortalizes human deeds in its pursuit. The penultimate focus of jihad is, Human beings must change so that they may change the world. From this perspective, jihad can be viewed as a revolutionary process with stages that proceed from the spiritual to the temporal realm of politics.

This interpretation is counter to the prevailing conceptions, primarily Western and like the one given by the pope, which view jihad in terms of destruction and suffering inflicted by religious fanatics on civilian populations. It is seen as a pure and simple expression of violent impulses born of religious conviction. Such interpretations ignore the political dimension of the action. In doing so, they also ignore the violence, genocide and coercion undertaken in the name of political convictions such as democracy, with the war in Iraq just one example. American sociologist Michael Mann has called this method of implementation “the dark side of democracy.”

Throughout history humans, inspired by faith, have undertaken action to gain for themselves and their group immortality. In this respect, the modern-day Muslim jihadists such as Al Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, Laskar-i-Taiba have much in common with the “constant warfare” waged by Puritan saints of the European Reformation. They fought their own natural inclinations to fulfill their visions of an ordered society and improve their chances for divine salvation. The Puritan Christians, by linking military action and politics to scripture, according to American philosopher Michael Walzer, were transformed into political revolutionaries, instruments of God for whom action in pursuit of the Holy Commonwealth on earth became the ultimate expression of faith.

The irony of modern jihadists is that the West contributed to building structures and institutional frameworks that sustained their Jihadist consciousness and these structures continue to exist to this day. In the 1980s, with the assistance of Western governments, jihadists were recruited from across the Muslim world, asked to support the people of Afghanistan in resisting the cruel and unjust occupation of the Russian “infidels.” President Reagan called them freedom fighters battling an evil empire, stating, “To watch the courageous Afghan freedom fighters battle modern arsenals with hand-held weapons is an inspiration to those who love freedom.” These jihadists have since turned into Frankenstein’s monsters, taking on the task of destroying their one-time sponsors.

After having won the war against the Russian “infidels” in Afghanistan, jihadists have turned their attention to the sufferings of their fellow Muslims in other “occupied” Muslim countries. My recent study of 6000 Muslim respondents in Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Egypt and Kazakhstan suggests that this is a significant component of contemporary Islamic consciousness. For its strategic success, the US-led war on terror relies on the overwhelming economic and military superiority of the West, but its very asymmetry will likely continue to inspire the jihadists to improvise their own weapons and strategies. Thus the war on terror will go on in the foreseeable future.

To understand what is driving large sections of Islamist jihadi movements around the world would require an understanding of the political nature of their action. To portray jihadists as incarnations of evil and as “Islamic fascists” is counterproductive because it only reinforces the pervasive view in the Muslim world that the “war on terror” is a “war on Islam.” This acts as a powerful catalyst for the recruitment of potential jihadists. If war is the failure of politics, then it would seem that political action is a prerequisite to prevent war. Again in the course of my research on Islamic consciousness, I was struck especially in the Middle East by an all-pervasive sense of humiliation arising from the inability of the Arab countries to match the military and economic superiority of Israel. This sense of humiliation is a major underlying cause of Islamic militancy and terrorism.

The sense of humiliation is reinforced by the economic power and absolute technological superiority of the West vis-a-viz Muslim countries. For jihadists, their actions are not simply motivated by impulsive bloody-mindedness or by an overwhelming desire to book a comfortable place in the life hereafter. For them, their jihad is fundamentally a political action through which they pursue the establishment of a just society as ordained in the scriptures and in the process seek to immortalize their own actions beyond their own earthly lives. From this perspective, jihad is ultimately a this-worldly political action and, therefore, amenable to resolution through negotiations as equal citizens of a globalizing world. Such a dialogue and the negotiations it will entail would alleviate some, if not all, of the mutual suspicions between Islam and the West.

Riaz Hassan is ARC Australian Professorial Fellow at Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia. He is the author of “Faithlines: Muslim Conceptions of Islam and Society,” published in 2003 by Oxford University Press. His new book “Inside Muslim Minds: Understanding Islamic Consciousness” will be published this year.

Rights:
© 2006 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization

For PArt II by Prof. Mohammed Ayoob, click here

Wednesday, September 27, 2006

"In the Line of Fire": Response of Pakistan Press



BBC News: September 27, 2006
Pakistan press lukewarm on Musharraf book

Pakistan's press shows little enthusiasm for President Musharraf's autobiography - in which he sought to explain the reasons behind his decision to end support for the Taleban following the 11 September attacks in 2001 - with several papers questioning both the contents and the timing of its publication.

One Islamist daily accuses Gen Musharraf of deliberately embellishing parts of the book only to boost its sales. Elsewhere, fears are expressed that some of the president's remarks could provoke hatred in religious circles and play into the hands of Pakistan's "enemies".

A commentator in the country's most widely-read English-language paper argues that Gen Musharraf's revelations were "stunts" which can only add to the general "gloom" in the country.

AUSAF

President Musharraf has revealed in his book "In the Line of Fire" that the CIA gave Pakistan a reward worth millions of dollars for capturing more than 350 terror suspects and that Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan sold nuclear centrifuges to North Korea, Libya and other countries only to earn money and satisfy his greed. The book is an incomplete story. It seems that the author has filled his writing with suspense, action and fiction only to sell a record number of copies.

ISLAM

The revelations may have a far-reaching impact on Pakistan's internal and external politics as well as on Mr Musharraf's personal life and integrity. He has confessed to receiving millions of dollars in return for handing over al-Qaeda people to the US. On the other hand, he has used humiliating language against religious scholars or "mullahs". These two points could provoke hatred against Musharraf among religious circles. It's unlikely that the book will be popular.

NAWA-I-WAQT


Mr Musharraf has set out "the out-of-the-box solution" for the Kashmir dispute. The people of Kashmir have not sacrificed 100,000 lives only to have Kashmir divided into four parts and the biggest part of it being handed over to India...

Whatever [he] has written regarding the international situation, he has prepared a long charge sheet against Pakistan and passed it on to its enemies. This will make it difficult for Pakistan to defend itself on many issues.


PAKISTAN

Mr Musharraf says Dr Khan may have been involved in the transfer of nuclear secrets to India. What supreme interest can be served by expressing doubts over the national hero as this can only lead to provoking unrest? Dr Khan should also be given an opportunity to clarify his position.

THE NEWS

On the issue of Dr Khan's personality, the president makes some telling but harsh remarks. He said the man, publicly perceived as the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb, possessed "a great talent for self-promotion and publicity and led the public to believe that he was building the bomb almost single-handedly... What is interesting, or should one say ironic, about these remarks is that even if the president's opinion of Dr Khan was accepted as being close to the truth, much of the reason why the country thought he was the father of the country's nuclear programme is because of the way he was projected by the government-owned media and also indirectly by the military itself.

THE NATION

Although Gen Musharraf is known for a candid expression of his views, the fact of incumbency must have weighed on him as a restraining factor lest his revelations and assessments have an adverse bearing on relations with powerful countries whose feathers had best not be ruffled in the interest of the state. There could also be reservations, for entirely different reasons, about the internal issues the book deals with.

DAWN

It is, of course, immaterial whether or not (US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage) threw in the Stone Age reference. It may well have been invented by ... Musharraf to convey the gist of America's uncompromising attitude at the time. The minor controversy stirred by Musharraf's decision to bring up the matter during his US visit has provoked greater interest in his autobiography, which suggests the stunt has served its purpose. But while the timing of the "revelation" may have been unexpected, it is difficult to fathom the expressions of surprise and/or alarm it has elicited from various quarters ... There is too much darkness in the land already, even when the wattage is undimmed. Neither "In the Line of Fire" nor Musharraf's protracted US tour will reduce the gloom.

BBC Monitoring selects and translates news from radio, television, press, news agencies and the internet from 150 countries in more than 70 languages. It is based in Caversham, UK, and has several bureaux abroad.

Also see CNN story on Musharraf's appearance in Jon Stewart Daily Show by clcking here

Tuesday, September 26, 2006

A view from America: By Shaheen Sehbai

Comment: Shaheen Sehbai is back in the media with a bang.

Friday club nausea: A view from America
By Shaheen Sehbai
The writer is a senior Washington-based Pakistani journalist

How should a Pakistani, living in a foreign land, away from the country for years, view, analyse and react to the mainstream press articles and website rants of a well-informed insider of the Pakistani establishment?

Is this frustration of an almost senile angry old man? Is this because he has been kept away from the corridors of power by military masters similar to those he has been serving for decades? Is this a belated feeling of guilt after enjoying, and mostly misusing, decades of unchecked and uninterrupted administrative and political power? Or are these the anguished cries of a genuinely concerned citizen who cannot see his country get buried into the dustbin of shame and ignominy?

Yes I am talking about the recent articles of Roedad Khan, the super-bureaucrat who proudly claims on his website that during his service he got to know two prime ministers Benazir and Nawaz Sharif and six presidents -- Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, ZA Bhutto, Ziaul Haq, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Farooq Leghari -- in varying measure.

"They all displayed vast differences in personality, character and style. Each one of them has directly or indirectly contributed to our generation's anguish and sense of betrayal, our loss of confidence in our rulers, in our country, in our future, in ourselves and the souring of the dream of Pakistan. Every now and then, I put pen to paper and unburden myself of the things that weigh upon my spirit: the sense of being in a blind alley, the perception of our collective guilt, the knowledge of all that has been irrevocably lost," he states recalling those he served.

At another place on the same website, under the title of "Friday Club", Mr Khan reveals the company he keeps every Friday in Islamabad at his residence. "This is an informal, social gathering of about 20 persons, mostly retired civil servants, all united by a common interest in current affairs, meeting every Friday, for intellectual stimulation and catharsis, without a fixed agenda at 10:30 am at the residence of Mr Roedad Khan, who acts as host and coordinator. Its origin goes back to the mid 1970s when 'club members' used to meet every Friday at Zubaida Agha's residence. Altaf Gauhar, Ejaz Naik and Roedad Khan formed the nucleus. Others joined the club later.

He claims the members of the Friday club now include retired governors, foreign ministers, air marshals, federal secretaries, ambassadors, educationists, poets and columnists. No papers are read and no speeches are delivered. No minutes are recorded and no record is kept. Discussions are uninhibited, free, frank, animated, and end up as brainstorming sessions. According to him these meetings last for about four hours.

Among other points on his long CV since he joined the civil service in 1949, the year of my birth, Roedad Khan can boast of several important appointments, including those of chief secretary, Sindh; secretary, ministry of interior; secretary general, ministry of interior; federal minister in charge of accountability; and advisor to the prime minister on accountability.

His latest article in a national daily newspaper has fired me up, so much so, that I decided to write about him ignoring the hot shot disclosures made by President Musharraf in his just released memoir, In the Line of Fire. Mr Khan had already come in my line of fire before General Musharraf released his bombshells and hot air balloons.

This is what Mr Khan wrote which angered me more than General Musharraf's truths. "Pakistan is a nation of teahouse politicians, midgets with no commitment to principles and no values; nothing to die for and nothing to live for. Here we have pocketbook liberals, pseudo-democrats and orthodox religious leaders concerned only with short-term profits and only too eager to do business with the military…" And he goes on and on against everybody else.

The descriptions he gave in the above paragraph, ironically, fit his own character and performance since 1949, like a glove on a lady's hand. He talks of everyone's failings except bureaucrats, his own, to be specific. He was a collaborator and partner in every crime the military rulers and their henchmen committed against the country but he forgets all that with ease. He calls politicians midgets with no commitment to principles, but does he have any of his own to show?

He accuses all pocketbook liberals, pseudo democrats and orthodox religious leaders of being opportunists and eager to do business with the military. But what about his own association and business with the military dictators of the past? Was Ayub Khan or Yahya Khan or Ziaul Haq an elected leader that he served and boot-licked?

Who does not remember his role as the leader of the secret election cell in the Ghulam Ishaq Khan presidency in 1990 when he rigged the election blatantly in collaboration with his colleague Ijlal Haider Zaidi and General Rafaqat? His exploits have all been recorded in several books written about those elections. Does that conduct fit into his description of "nothing to die for and nothing to live for" or was it only for a short-term gain?

By his own admission he sits only with the elite or the so-called elite of Islamabad, mostly those who are now retired and have nothing else to do but find faults with everybody else. The list of foreign ministers, retired governors etc. does not appear to include any one who may have enough respect and credibility that he could be named by name. The Friday club is apparently nothing but a group of has-beens who envy the magician Sharifuddin Peerzada and curse him day in and day out as he has managed to stay inside the power corridors, despite his age and frailty. So if they are not in, nothing is right, cannot be.

Mr Roedad Khan and his Friday club may be making the right noises at this point in time but they owe tons and tons of apologies to the nation before their voices could be taken as sincere, honest and well meaning. They have to remove the stigma of their yester years of serving all ilks of dictators and autocrats who have brought the country to the current pass. Mr Khan cannot escape the burden of guilt that would forever stay on his shoulders.

Who can say with confidence that if tomorrow General Musharraf summons him for consultations and help on how to run a democracy, in uniform, Roedad Khan would not order a new sherwani, or a three-piece suit, on an urgent delivery basis and be there in the king's court within 24 hours.

The lack of credibility issue has to be resolved first before the Friday Club lectures on democracy make any sense. Mr Khan can begin with an apology to the nation in his next column or display it on his website.

Delicate Dance?

In Pakistan, the delicate dance of a key US ally
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's deal with Islamists may weaken the broader war on terror.
By David Montero | The Christian Science Monitor: September 26, 2006

ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN – His autobiography, "In the Line of Fire," went on sale Monday and is aptly titled. Since Sept. 11, Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf has survived three assassination attempts by Muslim extremists. Later this week, Mr. Musharraf meets with the US and Afghan presidents in Washington to discuss the war on terror.
When the US surveys the world, there are few more pivotal players in that war than Musharraf. But at home, Pakistan's moderate leader is embattled. To strengthen his position, he's recently struck deals with a hard-line Islamic political party that, analysts say, could undermine counterterrorism efforts.


A controversial peace accord with Taliban militants in early September effectively gives the fighters open mobility in areas bordering Afghanistan. While he defends it, Musharraf doesn't mention that the accord is also paying political dividends to him and a peculiar, relatively unmentioned bedfellow: Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) or the Council of Islamic Clerics. This hard-line Islamist party controls North Waziristan, a province bordering Afghanistan, and brokered the deal.

JUI, which runs most of Pakistan's religious schools or madrassahs, helped educate and indoctrinate the Taliban throughout the 1980s and '90s. But today they are emerging as Musharraf's new political weapon.

JUI officials deny any direct link with the Taliban, but say they support them ideologically. "There is no question of sympathies," says Sahizada Khaled Ahmed Banoori, chief patron of JUI in NWFP. "JUI is a part of parliament. It means they are also part of the government. They are going to assist completely those things which are good for the country."

A new ally, but at what price?

As elections loom, JUI has become a trusted ally at a time when the president finds himself increasingly alienated from other parties. But there are potential costs to such an alliance, both for Pakistan and the international community. The concern is that as JUI becomes more important to Musharraf's political survival, it will make him less effective against the Taliban.

"His ability [to take on the Taliban] is compromised as long as he's got an alliance with the JUI," says Samina Ahmed, South Asia project director of the International Crisis Group. But he adds: "Who else is going to be there to keep Musharraf's political house in order in Balochistan besides JUI."

And Musharraf's road to political survival runs through the province of Balochistan and North Western Frontier Provinces (NWFP), two of the largest in Pakistan.

Analysts predict that Musharraf will need JUI to bring in votes in those regions during the presidential election of 2007, and their support for any government he forms should he win.

JUI won't say openly if it plans to side with Musharraf. "Everything that is good for the country, we will support that," says Mr. Banoori, adding that where Musharraf's policies are sound, JUI will support him.

But currently, Balochistan and NWFP are the provinces least likely to side with him. In August, Musharraf's army assassinated revered tribal leader Nawab Mohammed Akbar Khan Bugti, sparking riots in Balochistan and calls for secession. Few, if any, Baloch politicians support Musharraf now. The case is the same in NWFP, where the Pakistani military's hunt for Al Qaeda and the Taliban has left hundreds of civilians dead and a rising tide of resentment against the government.

When Musharraf looked for a way out of both quagmires, he turned to JUI.

In North Waziristan, JUI leaders responded by flexing their political muscles: they brought local Pakistani Taliban to the table and negotiated a cease-fire. For now, a delicate peace seems to be restored. But for many, relying on JUI as the middle man between the government and the Taliban is a Faustian deal, and it underscores Musharraf's political weakness at home. In the deal, JUI also won concessions for the local Taliban, resulting in the release from prison of hundreds of their fighters.

JUI members defend the deal as a practical solution for peace. "The North Waziristan deal is a good for the people, so we supported it," says Mr. Banoori.

Similarly, JUI has emerged as the key intermediary in Balochistan. For most of the summer the province has teetered on the brink of political conflagration following Bugti's death. Baloch nationalist parties have threatened to resign from the provincial assembly, a move the Islamic parties in Pakistan's parliament in Islamabad have endorsed. With a potential bloc building against him, Musharraf faced a crisis. But then JUI stepped in. Of all the Islamic political parties, only JUI holds any seats in Balochistan. JUI's leaders didn't support the resignation threat, effectively destroying its momentum and incurring the wrath of their conservative colleagues.

Musharraf's gatekeeper

Ironically, one of the central gatekeepers of Musharraf's political fortunes today are those who once paved the way for the Taliban. Despite JUI's ideological roots, or perhaps because of them, JUI is now a power to be contended with in the delicate puzzle of Pakistani politics. In national elections held in 2002, JUI emerged as the main political force in Balochistan and the North Western Frontier Province - thanks to new heights of Islamic resentment stoked by Washington's attack on Afghanistan. JUI and its Muslim coalition partners, the Muttahida Majlis-e Amal (MMA) or the United Action Front, also managed to secure 63 seats in the National Assembly.

"JUI was never able to win that many seats in the past," says Ramiullah Yusufzai, a longtime Pakistani journalist based in Peshawar. "But now, after the last election, its fortunes have gone sky high. It controls [Balochistan and NWFP]."

Musharraf has always relied on deals with the Islamic political parties to maintain political control. But in recent years most Islamists have turned against him, issuing scathing attacks on his relationship with Washington and his efforts to induce moderation. Whenever there is a political crisis, the Islamists are among the most vociferous calling for Musharraf's resignation. But not the JUI, analysts say. Although hardline, they are more pragmatic and less ideological in their political decisions, because, like Musharraf, they have a lot to lose. It was in February 2005 that JUI first broke ranks with the other religious parties and began supporting Musharraf, causing strains in the MMA alliance.

"JUI has a huge stake in the continuation of this system, unlike other religious parties," argues Ershad Mahmud, an analyst with the Institute of Policy Studies, an Islamabad think tank. "It is the intent of the JUI to continue with this government."

Today JUI and Musharraf enjoy a mutually beneficial marriage of convenience. Musharraf, analysts say, needs them as much as they do him for his presidency bid in 2007.

"Musharraf doesn't want that all opposition parties will get together against him. If he can keep JUI slightly to his side, then he can prevent a movement," says Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi, a political analyst in Lahore.

Musharraf "In the Line of Fire"



‘In the Line of Fire’ launched AQ Khan may have leaked N-designs to India: Musharraf
Reveals CIA paid millions of dollars to Pakistan for handing over al-Qaeda terrorists

By Shaheen Sehbai; The NEws, September 25, 2006

WASHINGTON: President Pervez Musharraf launched his memoirs here on Monday revealing that before Kargil, India was about to attack Pakistan, Dr AQ Khan may have leaked Pakistan’s nuclear secrets to India, he (Musharraf) never conceded all demands to Secretary Colin Powell on his first phone call after 9/11 and CIA had paid millions of dollars to the government of Pakistan for handing over al-Qaeda terrorists.

Musharraf has also disclosed that another plot to kill him had been unearthed in April of 2005 which was aborted by the ISI when they arrested the main plotter in Islamabad, sleeping at the back of a bus with his cell phone on.

These startling revelations come in his book “In the Line of Fire” released by publishers Simon & Schuster throughout the world today with a ceremony in New York at the Council on Foreign Relations addressed by General Musharraf.

Some of the shocking facts revealed by General Musharraf in his book could embarrass Washington, New Delhi, London, Tehran and many other world capitals but the book is certain to become a best seller in no time, reaping millions of dollars for the publishers and the writer.

Washington is already stunned with the disclosure that Richard Armitage threatened to “bomb Pakistan into the Stone Age”, a fact which Musharraf recalls with regret in his book (Page 201), but his disclosure that CIA paid millions to the government in Islamabad for handing over Al-Qaeda leaders is already causing more embarrassment.

The US Department of Justice official was quoted as saying: “We didn’t know about this. It should not happen. These bounty payments are for private individuals who help to trace terrorists on the FBI’s most wanted list, not foreign governments.”

More disclosures include the two secret letters written by ailing nuclear scientist Dr A.Q. Khan, one to the Iranians and the other to his daughter in London asking her to reveal all Pakistani nuclear secrets through British journalists. To Iranians Dr Khan asked them not to reveal his name to the International Atomic Energy Agency and after this issue died down he would provide them with more technology.

But the most astounding statement about nuclear proliferation comes when Musharraf reveals that Dr AQ Khan’s Dubai base may have provided Pakistan’s centrifugal designs to the Indians. “There is little doubt that AQ Khan was the central figure in proliferation network but he was assisted over the years by a number of money seeking freelancers from other countries, mainly in Europe. These people, according to AQ Khan included nationals of Switzerland, Holland, Britain and Sri Lanka,” he writes.

“Ironically the network based in Dubai also employed several Indians some of whom have since vanished. There is a strong probability that the Indian Uranium enrichment programme may also have its roots in the Dubai-based network and could be a copy of the Pakistani centrifuge design,” he says.

About Dr AQ Khan’s letters he said: “The letter to Iran was being carried by a business partner of AQ Khan in which Khan advised some of his friends in Iran not to mention his name under any circumstances to the IAEA. He also advised them to name dead people during investigations, just as he was naming dead people. He also promised Iran more help after this event passed.

The other letter was addressed by him to his daughter who lives in London. The letter besides being critical of the government contained detailed instructions for her to go public on Pakistan’s nuclear secrets through certain British journalists.

Musharraf says for years Pakistan government ignored Dr AQ Khan’s lavish life style and tales of wealth, properties and corrupt practices. In hindsight that neglect was apparently a serious mistake, he says.

Dr AQ Khan, Musharraf writes, was not part of the problem but “the problem” itself. “When AQK departed our scientific organisations started functioning smoothly. He was a self-centred and abrasive man and could not be a team player. He did not want anyone to excel or steal the limelight on any occasion on any subject. He had a huge ego and he knew the art of playing to the gallery and manipulating the media. All this made him a difficult person to deal with.

Regarding Dr AQ Khan he says the more difficult issue for him was to hold his open trial. “The public would be sure to protest any prosecution, no matter what the facts. When I confronted him he broke down and felt extremely guilty and asked me for an official pardon. I told him that his apology should be to the people of Pakistan. It was then decided that he should appear on TV and apologise personally to the nation. I then accepted his request for a pardon and put him in protective custody for further investigation and his own sake.”

Musharraf denies flatly that the Pakistan Army or the government, either the present one or those in the past, were in any way involved in the Dr AQ Khan proliferation network. “On the basis of the thorough probe we conducted in 2003-04 I can say with confidence that neither the Pakistan Army nor any of the past governments of Pakistan were ever involved or had any knowledge of Dr AQ Khan’s proliferation activities.”

On Armitage he writes that the threat of being bombed into the Stone Age was made but he said though it was regrettable, it had nothing to do with his decision to take sides with the US against Taliban.

He listed the seven demands presented by US Ambassador Wendy Chamberlain and the State Department and said he had refused to accept two of them. Musharraf expresses shock at the aspersion that he accepted all pre-conditions of Colin Powell, made in a phone call.

On Kargil Musharraf says it was not a one-off operation but part of a series of operations. “We also had intelligence through various sources suggesting an Indian plan to conduct some operations in our Northern Areas. There was specific information of a possible Indian attack in the Shaqma sector; it was aimed at positions we had used to shell the road between Dras and Kargil in early summer 1998, in response to continuous artillery shelling by the Indians at the Neelum Valley Road on our side of the Line of Control.”

The Kargil operation, he asserted, was conducted flawlessly, a tactical marvel of military professionalism … Considered purely in military terms, the Kargil operations were a landmarks in the history of the Pakistan Army. As few as five battalions, in support of the freedom fighter groups, were able to compel the Indians to employ more than four divisions, with the bulk of the Indian artillery coming from strike formations meant for operations in the southern plains.

“The Indians were also forced to mobilize their entire national resources, including their air force. By July 4 they did were fully prepared to hold our dominating positions ahead of the watershed.

Our nation remains proud of its commanders and troops, whose grit and determination I observed during my frequent visits to the forward areas. Many officers and men sacrificed their lives on the snow-clad peaks and in the boulder-ridden valleys of the Northern Areas.”

Musharraf directly blamed Nawaz Sharif for the ceasefire in Washington on July 4 1999. “The prime minister asked me several times whether we should accept a cease-fire and withdraw. My answer every time was restricted to the optimistic military situation; I left the political decisions to him. He wanted to fire his gun from my shoulder, but it was not my place to offer his.”

“I also remember his minister, Raja Zafar-ul-Haq, an ardent supporter of his, to have been the strongest proponent of no cease-fire and no withdrawal. Chaundhry Shujaat Hussain, the interior minister at the time, who was to play a major political role after Nawaz Sharif’s departure, said that whatever we did, we must stress that Kargil was “our joint effort and collective responsibility.” Nawaz Sharif did not like this truth and stood up abruptly, saying that would continue later-but this never happened.”

IN THE LINE OF FIRE: AQ Khan was motivated by ego, money
Daily Times, September 26, 2006

WASHINGTON: President Pervez Musharraf said in a television interview broadcast on Sunday evening that Dr AQ Khan had done what he had done because of “ego, satisfaction and money”.

The much-awaited interview, recorded in Islamabad, was part of the widely watched CBS programme 60 Minutes. It failed to produce any surprises since the most sensational bits had already been aired by the print and electronic media around the world.

Gen Musharraf was closely questioned as to how the centrifuges that Dr Khan is charged with having supplied to North Korea and Iran could have been taken out of Pakistan’s highly-secured and military-guarded nuclear facilities undetected by the government or the army. He replied that the military was there to safeguard the facilities from outside attack. When the interviewer suggested that in that case the internal controls were a “little weak,” Gen Musharraf disagreed, asserting that they were not weak but “very strong”. He said the centrifuges, whose designs, parts and they themselves had been sent out, could easily have been placed in a car and moved out. When the interviewer wondered if 18 tonnes of equipment could have been thus removed without anyone noticing, Gen Musharraf replied that it could not have been done at one time. “It must have been transported many times” and thereafter put on a C-130 and flown out.

All the C-130s in the country are owned and flown by the Pakistan Air Force, but this question was not put to the president. Asked if the reason nobody from outside had been allowed to talk to Dr Khan was the fear that he might incriminate the army, the president replied, “That is absolutely not the case,” adding that US President Bush and CIA’s George Tenet are “very satisfied and quite comfortable with whatever we have done”.

He said “the most embarrassing moment” of his life came when at President Bush’s suggestion, the CIA director George Tenet showed him Pakistani centrifuge designs, which had been sold to Libya and Iran. President Musharraf said he did not ask the CIA how it had come upon such highly classified material. The president told 60 Minutes that he ordered an investigation and discovered that the most highly sophisticated nuclear technology was not only sent to North Korea but also to Iran. He said he did not think the Pakistani people would tolerate a long trial and prison sentence for a man who is seen as a national hero.

Musharraf said, “Today, he is a hero of Pakistanis because he has given us the atom bomb.” He added that he later pardoned Dr Khan but put him under house arrest. When the interviewer suggested that Dr Khan was living a life of “splendour,” the president replied that Dr Khan was comfortable but “now he does not even speak on (the) telephone”. He said Dr Khan was a lone wolf who exerted key control over Pakistan’s nuclear operations and was able to transfer nuclear technology with no official help.

The interviewer described Pakistan with its nuclear weapons as the world’s “most dangerous” country. When he asked the president if he found it disturbing that those who bombed his motorcade in Islamabad were from the Pakistan Air Force, he replied in the affirmative but added that they were low-level personnel who were more susceptible to extremist, terrorist tendencies and could be indoctrinated to do such things. The president agreed that the situation had been aggravated by his alliance with the United States.

He said he had been told by his director of intelligence (Lt Gen Mahmood Ahmed) after his meeting with former deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage that if Pakistan did not cooperate, then it should be prepared to be bombed into the Stone Age. Musharraf said he found Armitage’s words rude and a threat but he had to think and take action in the interest of the nation. He viewed Armiatge’s words as a threat and he felt that after what had happened on 9/11, the world’s sole superpower would be a “wounded” country and it would do anything to counter and punish the perpetrators. “And if we stand in the way of that, we are going to suffer,” he added.

Questioned about the Pakistan-link of some of the London bombers this summer who were caught and if it bothered him or surprised him, the president replied, “It disappointed me, yes, but at the same time … they are not Pakistanis. They are born and bred in Britain and they are British”. Asked why these people had to come to Pakistan to talk to somebody and get their blessings, the president replied, “That is because of whatever has happened for 26 years, so this place becomes the boiling pot.”

The president told 60 Minutes that the children of those who came to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan are still in cities like Peshawar and in the no-man’s-land along the Afghanistan border. The interviewer called them a Frankenstein monster that goes by the name of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. This observation was intercut with footage of bomb making being taught to militant recruits. The interviewer told the president that Afghan President Hamid Karzai believes “Musharraf is complicit” and then asked if Karzai was correct in saying that the Taliban come to Pakistan where they are trained. The president replied, “Yes, indeed, people could be coming here; people could be training (here) and going back on their own. We’ll act against them and we’re trying to do our best”. The president said it is his belief that the Taliban must be defeated “absolutely, one hundred percent.”

APP adds: Musharraf said that he could not confirm reports that Osama bin Laden died last month of typhoid in Pakistan but reaffirmed his commitment to hunt down the Al Qaeda leader. Speaking in an exclusive interview with The Dallas Morning News in Highland Park, Texas, where he paid a brief visit on Saturday for a routine medical check up, he said he was aware of a French intelligence report on bin Laden’s death, but could not comment on its details. Replying to a question, General Musharraf said that his visit to the United States has helped “clear certain misperceptions” about Pakistan’s role in the war on terror. The president said his meeting with President Bush was “extremely positive”. khalid hasan

For additional stories on Musharraf's memoirs from international press, click for India here, for BBC here, and for New York Times here

Monday, September 25, 2006

What happened between Musharraf & Mahmood after 9/11 attacks



Inside Story about Musharraf-Mahmood Tussle
Hassan Abbas: September 24, 2006

General Pervez Musharraf’s memoir In the Line of Fire is expected to generate a lot of debate and discussion in the days to come. Except some western journalists and Musharraf’s close friends (three ghost writers) hardly anyone has had a chance yet to read the book from cover to cover. The excerpts of the book leaked through Indian media and General Musharraf’s statements to some American media outlets however have already created some controversies. In the United States, controversy is considered a positive thing, so the book is bound to become a bestseller here, but in Pakistan probably the opposite is true.

This article is not a review of the book (as I haven’t got hold of a copy yet), but it endeavors to throw some light on the widely reported Musharraf comment about the Armitage threat conveyed through Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed, the then Director General of the ISI. I had done research on this specific question while working on my book “Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism” a couple of years ago, and here are my discoveries and conclusions – some already published and some new. On the eve of the 9/11 terror attacks, in a crucial National Security Council meeting at the White House, Colin Powell, the then U.S. secretary of state, strongly asserted: “We have to make it clear to Pakistan and Afghanistan, this is show time.”

General Mahmood Ahmed, who was on an official visit to the United States as a CIA guest, and Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, were asked to attend a meeting with senior American officials on September 12, 2001. To be fully prepared, Mahmood called Musharraf to discuss the emerging scenario and take instructions for the important meeting. Musharraf told him to report back immediately after the meeting and gauge how the wind is blowing. On the morning of September 12, the U.S. deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitage, in a “hard-hitting conversation,” told Mahmood that Pakistan has to make a choice—“you are either 100 percent with us or 100 percent against us—–there is no gray area.” In the words of Armitage, Mahmood “was immediately willing to cooperate.” In the afternoon, Mahmood was invited to CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia, where he told George Tenet, the CIA director, that in his view Mullah Omar, the Taliban chief, was a religious man with humanitarian instincts and not a man of violence! This was a bit difficult for the CIA officials to digest and rightly so as the Taliban’s track record, especially in the realm of human rights, was no secret. General Mahmood was firmly told that Mullah Omar and the Taliban would have to face U.S. military might if Osama bin Laden along with other Al-Qaeda leaders were not handed over without delay. To send the message across clearly, Richard Armitage held a second meeting with Mahmood the same day, informing him that he would soon be handed over specific American demands which are “non-negotiable”, to which Mahmood reiterated that Pakistan would cooperate.

Having gone through the list that was provided to him on September 13, Mahmood declared that he was quite clear on the subject and that “he knew how the President thought, and the President would accept these points.” Mahmood then faxed the document to Musharraf and in a subsequent call conveyed his impressions. Mahmood was of the view that the words used by Armitage about Taliban were infact meant for Pakistan and he didn’t consider it necessary to emphasize this point. Musharraf genuinely believed that such a direct threat was given. While Musharraf had hardly gone through the list of demands, his aide de camp informed him that Colin Powell was on the line. Musharraf liked and respected Powell, and the conversation was not going to be a problem. He told him that he understood and appreciated the U.S. position, but that he would respond to the U.S. demands after having discussed these with his associates. Powell was a bit perplexed at this response and thought it necessary to inform him that General Mahmood had already assured them that these demands would be acceptable to the government of Pakistan. It is not certain if Musharraf bit his lip when he heard this, but he did grit his teeth, and his relationship with Mahmood suffered a crack. Interestingly Mahmood on his return from the US also informed Musharraf about his visit to Pentagon after the tragedy and argued that there were no traces of any commercial plane having hit the Pentagon. He also made a case that in his assessment, the attacks were an inside job! Even some senior generals surrounding Musharraf then were convinced by this line of argument largely based on Mahmood’s “first hand” narrative.

On September 16, 2001, Musharraf sent a delegation to the Taliban with the mission to convince them to hand over Osama bin Laden. It included Lieutenant General Mahmood, and a group of religious figures known to have good relations with Taliban. The mission failed, but more worrisome was the revelation that Mufti Shamzai, instead of conveying the official message, encouraged Mullah Omar to start a jihad against the United States if it attacked Afghanistan. Musharraf came to know of this fact through an ISI official who had accompanied the team and had loyally reported the matter to Musharraf. After this, Mahmood, whose arrogance and presumption had come to grate on Musharraf’s expansive tolerance by now, was offered the ceremonial slot of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, because Musharraf was still grateful to him for what he had done for him on the eve of October 12, 1999. Mahmood refused the offer thinking that he was indispensable and a possible successor to Musharraf. But things were changing fast and Musharraf now had the support of most of his corps commanders about his new alignment with the US (except Generals Usmani, Mahmood and Aziz who had advised caution). Gauging the mood of changing circumstances and knowing that Musharraf was about to make some important changes in the military, Mahmood, through a close friend of Musharraf – a retired brigadier based in Islamabad, put in a request to be retained as director general of ISI, even if an officer junior to him is to be promoted as a four star general for the post of CJCSC. This time Musharraf refused and Mahmood had to go home.

This sudden departure of Mahmood led to many rumors and there are dozens of internet sources that hint towards involvement of Mahmood with the 9/11 attacks itself. Ofcourse, all of that is pure rubbish. Mahmood afterwards went into a low profile and started working on his favorite project – a book on the 1965 war. When he finished the work, he sent the manuscript to GHQ for permission to publish. Interestingly the title of the work was “Myth of 1965 victory”. Musharraf, himself looked at the manuscript and noted on the file that Mahmood should re-consider the title – especially use of the word myth in relation to the 1965 war. This was enough of a hint and Mahmood almost shelved the idea of publishing the book for a while. Mahmood had already requested Musharraf for a job and thought that he should not annoy Musharraf on any count. He was right - he got a job soon. And instead Musharraf started working on his book project.

The article was carried by Daily Times on September 25, 2006, which can be accessed by clicking here

For the benefit of Watandost readers, I am posting an excerpt from my book that covers what happened in Pakistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy. The passages also throw light on Musharraf-Mahmood differences.


Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror (M E Sharpe, 2005)
Chapter 10:
9/11 and the War on Terror

Within hours of the deadly September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. administration concluded that Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda operating from Afghanistan were behind the attacks, and that any successful counterstrike would not be possible without the support and assistance of Pakistan. While addressing the American nation after the tragedy, President George W. Bush left no doubt as to the fate of the Taliban regime when he plainly declared that, “We will make no distinction between those who planned these acts and those who harbor them.”1 This led Colin Powell, the U.S. secretary of state, to assert in the National Security Council (NSC) meeting at the White House the same night: “We have to make it clear to Pakistan and Afghanistan, this is show time.”2

Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed, Pakistan’s ISI chief, who was on an official visit to the United States as a CIA guest, and Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, were asked to attend a meeting with senior American officials on September 12, 2001. To be fully prepared, Mahmood called Musharraf to discuss the emerging scenario and take instructions for the important meeting. On the morning of September 12, the U.S. deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitage, in a “hard-hitting conversation,” told Mahmood that Pakistan has to make a choice—“you are either 100 percent with us or 100 percent against us—–there is no gray area.”3 In the words of Armitage, Mahmood “was immediately willing to cooperate.”4 In the afternoon, Mahmood was invited to CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia, where he told George Tenet, the CIA director, that in his view Mullah Omar, the Taliban chief, was a religious man with humanitarian instincts and not a man of violence!5 This was a bit difficult for the CIA officials to digest and rightly so as the Taliban’s track record, especially in the realm of human rights, was no secret. General Mahmood was told politely but firmly that Mullah Omar and the Taliban would have to face U.S. military might if Osama bin Laden along with other Al-Qaeda leaders were not handed over without delay. To send the message across clearly, Richard Armitage held a second meeting with Mahmood the same day, informing him that he would soon be handed over specific American demands, to which Mahmood reiterated that Pakistan would cooperate.6

Meanwhile, as expected, Musharraf had received his first call from Wendy Chamberlain, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan. After the pleasantries, she expressed the hope that Pakistan would come on board and extend all its cooperation to the United States in bringing the perpetrators of the terrorist act to justice. He gave her the assurances she sought, but could not restrain himself from enumerating Pakistan’s past experiences of cooperation with America, and the list of broken promises that was the compensation Pakistan often received from such alliances. But Ms. Chamberlain assured him that this time it would be different. For lack of an alternative, he dutifully played the part of a reassured Third World leader.
As per the credible narrative of Bob Woodward, General Mahmood on September 13, 2001, was handed a formal list of the U.S. demands by Mr. Armitage and was asked to convey these to Musharraf and was also duly informed, for the sake of emphasis, that these were “not negotiable.” Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, and the assistant secretary of state, Christina Rocca, had drafted the list in the shape of a “non-paper.” It categorically asked Pakistan to:

1. Stop Al-Qaeda operatives coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan, and end ALL logistical support for Osama bin Laden.
2. Give blanket overflight and landing rights to U.S. aircraft.
3. Give the U.S. access to Pakistani naval and air bases and to the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
4. Turn over all intelligence and immigration information.
5. Condemn the September 11 attacks and curb all domestic expressions of support for terrorism.
6. Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban, and stop Pakistani volunteers from going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban.
7. Note that, should the evidence strongly implicate Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan, and should the Taliban continue to harbor him and his accomplices, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, end support for the Taliban, and assist the U.S. in the aforementioned ways to destroy Osama and his network.7

Having gone through the list, Mahmood declared that he was quite clear on the subject and that “he knew how the President thought, and the President would accept these points.”8 Mahmood then faxed the document to Musharraf. While the latter was going through it and in the process of weighing the pros and cons of each demand, his aide de camp informed him that Colin Powell was on the line. Musharraf liked and respected Powell, and the conversation was not going to be a problem. He told him that he understood and appreciated the U.S. position, but that he would respond to the U.S. demands after having discussed these with his associates.9 Powell was far too polite to remind him that he in fact was the government, but did inform him that his general in Washington had already assured them that these demands would be acceptable to the government of Pakistan. It is not certain if Musharraf bit his lip when he heard this, but he did grit his teeth, and his relationship with Mahmood suffered a crack. Musharraf was in no doubt that, in the circumstances, he would have accepted every American demand, but only after putting up the right appearances. Mahmood’s presumption had denied him the act and national prestige had suffered a blow, though the bruise must have shown more clearly on his personal ego, which has as large a compass, as it is tender.

Musharraf’s response to Powell was in line with his earlier statement on the eve of the 9/11 tragedy—he had condemned it as the “most brutal and horrible act of terror” and in his message to President Bush had said that the world must unite to fight against terrorism in all its forms and root out this modern-day evil.10 Later, discussions with Wendy Chamberlain and a telephone conversation with General Mahmood in the United States on the issue had helped him gauge the direction in which the wind was blowing. On the eve of September 12 he had already discussed the issue in Pakistan’s National Security Council and made up his mind. But he was not expecting an “either you are with us or against us” proposition, with a specific seven-point demand list and a very short deadline to respond. To reply, he intended to take the army corps commanders in confidence, but courtesy of Mahmood, he had to immediately give the U.S. administration all the assurances they needed from Pakistan, though there was to be no public declaration of the same because Musharraf needed an ex post facto formalization of the same after meeting with his corps commanders
Corps commanders, on the other hand, were unaware of this development when they all met in a nuclear bunker near Islamabad on September 14, 2001, believing that they could talk without the risk of U.S. surveillance in a highly secured location. Nine corps commanders and a dozen other senior staff officers at the army’s General Headquarters (GHQ) were in attendance, including the chiefs of the ISI and MI. Musharraf gave out a cogent exposition of why Pakistan had to stand with America. He told them that Pakistan faced a stark choice—it could either join the U.S. coalition that was supported by the United Nations Security Council, or expect to be declared a terrorist state, leading to economic sanctions. Most of his commanders nodded in sage agreement, but General Mahmood sat in sullen silence; Lieutenant General Aziz registered his polite disagreement; General Mushtaq was entirely consistent and honorable in dissent; and the unfortunate Lieutenant General Jamshed Gulzar seemed to have lost his sanity and discovered his nonexistent heroism to join the dissenters. But it was General Khalid Maqbool who really sparkled, giving a glittering performance of unctuous courtiership. In the process he won the heart of Musharraf by pleading his infallibility. And Lieutenant General Usmani, the number two man in the army, a self-confessed “soldier of god,” registered his impolite disagreement. Usmani had started out as a moderate and an open-minded officer, but later in his career he found the intolerant fringe of Islam, where he saw his own piety in discovering the imperfections in others. By the time he became deputy chief of army staff, he had become reclusive, shutting himself in his house and walking about in a Saudi jubba (gown) topped by a green turban. All this was widely known when Musharraf promoted him.

General Usmani’s argument was that ditching the long-standing Pakistan policy of supporting the Taliban without any specific American incentive in return should be avoided.11 On the contrary, Musharraf was of the view that Pakistan should be supportive of the United States as a matter of principle, and any hint of economic incentives would be inappropriate at a time when the United States was in a “shock and anger” mood.12 Lieutenant General Aziz, on the other hand, was of the view that there was a possibility of a domestic backlash if Afghanistan were attacked, to which Musharraf agreed, but he insisted that in case of any delay in agreeing to the U.S. terms, India would benefit by currying favor with the United States. This was a sufficient argument for the Pakistani military commanders to agree with Musharraf’s opinion, though it took them six hours to reach this “consensus.”
The next day, on September 15, Musharraf conveyed General Aziz’s concerns about a possible domestic fallout to Wendy Chamberlain without naming him, explaining that in such an eventuality Pakistan would expect the United States to understand such pressures and continue to support him.13 The message was duly conveyed to senior officials in the U.S. administration.

The point that had helped Musharraf clinch the argument during the corps commanders’ meeting a day earlier, in reference to India, was in fact substantial. Of course, Musharraf and his corps commanders were unaware that hardly a few hours before their meeting had commenced, the leading Indian intelligence service, named the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), had convinced the CIA that “Pakistani jihadists” were planning an “imminent attack on the White House,” and as a precautionary measure the U.S. Secret Service had even made arrangements to evacuate President Bush from the White House.14 President Bush was understandably exhausted by the hectic schedule and attendant pressures, hence to the surprise of everyone he refused to leave the White House until shown the exact information. U.S. Secret Service director Brian Stafford told him that he was in immediate danger and that the report was credible, as Indian intelligence was well wired into Pakistan, but the president was unmoved. Still, the threat was considered so serious that Vice President Dick Cheney was shifted to a safe location and nonessential staff at the White House were allowed to go home early. This explains the credibility of Indian intelligence in the eyes of the CIA, but most likely its privilege and trust was misused in this case. Arguably, it was an effort on the part of India to push the U.S. administration to include Pakistan on the hit list. Without a doubt, religious extremists are narrow-minded bigots and violence indeed is their bread and butter, but to make a case that any of the domestic Pakistani groups (e.g., Lashkar-i-Taiba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) were capable of launching a terrorist attack on the White House was an exaggerated assessment. The report also inferred that Pakistani intelligence possibly was sponsoring this attack, which was not possible. For the sake of argument, even if the Pakistani jihadi groups were capable of orchestrating such a strike, Indian intentions behind providing this “timely” intelligence assessment were less than noble.

On September 16, 2001, Musharraf sent a delegation to the Taliban with the mission to convince them to hand over Osama bin Laden. It included Lieutenant General Mahmood, the ISI chief, and Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, head of the famous Deobandi Madrasa in Binori town, Karachi. It is the same Madrasa where Osama bin Laden first met Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, a few years ago. The mission failed, which was expected, but more worrisome was the revelation that Mufti Shamzai, instead of conveying the official message, encouraged Mullah Omar to start a jihad against the United States if it attacked Afghanistan.15 After this, Mahmood, whose arrogance and presumption had come to grate on Musharraf’s expansive tolerance by now, was offered the ceremonial slot of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.16 He refused.

However, Musharraf was under immense pressure, both domestically and from the United States on how to proceed vis-Ć -vis U.S. demands and expectations. While talking to a selected gathering of retired generals, seasoned diplomats, and politicians, on September 18, Musharraf argued that the decision to extend “unstinting support” to the United States was taken under tremendous pressure and in the face of fear, that in case of refusal, a direct military action by a coalition of the United States, India, and Israel against Pakistan was a real possibility. When confronted by the audience that he still should have consulted a cross-section of society before taking any decision, he mentioned the short deadline he was given for a response.17 It was easy for Musharraf to have a dialogue with this group, but leaders of Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (both Sami and Fazl groups) were not ready to listen to Musharraf’s justifications. They asked for a review of government policy and insisted that Musharraf demand from the United States a credible evidence of bin Laden’s involvement in the 9/11 attacks. This was what the Taliban also asked for a day earlier. On September 18, when a journalist posed this question to the U.S. secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, his reply was that sharing intelligence with other countries posed a dilemma as that could lead to a drying up of sources of information.18 But Musharraf was finally shown some evidence on October 3, 2001. A day later the Pakistan Foreign Office declared that the “material provides sufficient basis for [bin Laden’s] indictment in a court of law.”19 Musharraf should have been allowed to share the information with the people of Pakistan.

Any how, Musharraf knew that war was coming to Afghanistan. On October 7, 2001, the U.S. attack on Afghanistan commenced, and what was left of the country was bombed to smithereens. The many dead did not receive the dignity of even a decent count. The sheer magnitude of the effort stunned the people, and the Pakistani clerics were unnerved for the first time since their steady rise in influence and power, which helped Musharraf consolidate his position. Pakistan had taken a historical U-turn in its policy toward the Taliban by fully supporting the U.S. military campaign. On the domestic scene, Musharraf started to announce measures against the hard-line religious groups and limit the license of the mullahs. Most Pakistanis heaved a sigh of relief—for those oppressed by all and sundry, suppression of the mullahs was to be one oppression less.

This change in policy needed a change of faces as well. Gauging the mood, Mahmood, through a close friend of Musharraf, put in a request to be retained as director general of ISI.20 Musharraf refused and Mahmood had to go home. General Aziz retained the esteem and affection of his boss to fill the office so recently refused by Mahmood, and General Usmani packed his bags and vanished. Shortly thereafter Generals Mushtaq and Gulzar lost their commands and were sidelined, and Khalid Maqbool, was made governor of the largest and most populous province in the country. With General Ghulam Ahmed already having passed away, and General Amjad not being a part of Musharraf’s inner core, there was no one left in the fighting army with courage enough to register a disagreement with their chief. Ironically, Musharraf mistakenly took this as an omen of his rising popularity in the army.

NOTES
1. Text of President Bush’s speech on September 11, 2001; last accessed May 15, 2003, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/bush.speech.text/.
2. Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), p. 32.
3. Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 2.
4. Interview: Richard Armitage, “Campaign Against Terror,” PBS (Frontline), April 19, 2002; last accessed June 2, 2003, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/
interviews/armitage.html.
5. Woodward, Bush at War, p. 47.
6. Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, p. 2.
7. Woodward, Bush at War, pp. 58–59.
8. Interview: Richard Armitage, “Campaign Against Terror,” PBS (Frontline), April 19, 2002.
9. Interview with a staff officer of General Pervez Musharraf, June 2002.
10. “Musharraf Condemns Attack,” Dawn, September 12, 2001.
11. Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, p. 3.
12. Interview: President Pervez Musharraf, Campaign Against Terror, PBS (Frontline), May 14, 2002; last accessed June 6, 2003, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/
interviews/musharraf.html.
13. Ibid.
14. The episode is narrated in Woodward, Bush at War, pp. 55–57.
15. S. Hussain, “Clerics Violated Official Brief During Visit to Afghanistan,” Friday Times, October 7, 2001.
16. Interview with a senior staff officer at GHQ.
17. “Pakistan Baking U.S. Under Pressure: CE Briefs Think Tanks,” Dawn, September 19, 2001.
18. Department of Defense News Briefing, September 18, 2001. For the transcript, see www.defenselink.mil.
19. Transcript of the press conference addressed by the Foreign Office Spokesman, October 4, 1001, at www.pak.gov.pk.
20. Ibid.